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Intersubjectivity is concerned with how meaning is derived 
frcm inter-subjective communication, or human community. 
Intersubjectivity is the context for the formation of values, 
morals, knowledge and institutions.
This broad topic includes "unconscious" intersubjectivity 
which deals with false consciousness. This describes a duality 
of consciousness and distorted consciousness, the latter being
values to which persons ascribe but do not question because the 
values have become unconscious habits issuing from prevailing 
norms; i.e., consumerism, individualism. This consciousness
which lacks reflection is false because the person is not aware 
of repressive economic forces (capitalist exploitation) which
mold and maintain the values of a society, namely ruling class 
values.
Further research on this "unconscious consensus of values" 
led to the discovery of intersubjectivity as a problem in
philosophy. This is the problem of constituting an objectively 
shared world between subjects, or persons. Intersubjectivity 
(in this paper) takes two forms: one, transcendental idealism,
and two, historical hermenuetics. The first focuses on 
transcendental reason and the discerrment of objective truth
thru a scientific, thematic methodology. It establishes a 
position of ahistorical objectivity from which to identify 
distortion and validate truth.
Historical hermeneutics (interpretation) recognizes the
historical origin of all knowledge and value formation, and the
inherent distortion of all human interaction. Here distortion
is viewed as prejudice; not pejoratively, but as the text of an 
individual's life history which cannot be escaped and which 
orients all action. Hermeneutics as such does not arrive at 
meaning thru scientific method which eradicates distortion. 
Meaning is created intersubjectively in language and dialogue
with distortion as a dynamic component for the expansion of 
experience and knowledge. This latter view of meaning as a 
creation of human intersubjectivity subverts Cartesian
subjectivity and questions the rule of the techno-scientific
structure in society. It leaves authority open to question and 
change, and offers hope as a medium for preserving and
realizing human freedom in a world of plurality.
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PREFACE
This project of intersubjectivity arose from a Marxist 
concern with false consciousness. False consciousness is 
the identification of a schism in social reality where 
prevailing values and norms are seen as the legitimation 
structures of a repressive ruling class. These values 
require the acquiescence of the masses in order to maintain 
their authority, which is the authority of the elite. This 
smokescreen of oppression is perpetuated by individualist 
philosophy or Cartesian egology, utilitarianism, consumerism 
and scientistic-technological instrumental reason which 
objectifies the world and persons into means for pregiven 
ends. Individualist doctrine centers knowledge and meaning 
on the individual and not on the individual's social 
relationships. Thus, the goals of a society remain goals of 
the individual, not goals of a society as a whole nor as 
global goals.
In that each individual ascribes to these individualist 
values, there becomes an unconscious consensus which 
legitimates these values. Thus, there is an unconscious 
intersubjectivity sustaining social institutions. This is 
called systematic distortion in the work of Jlirgen 
Habermas. It is his project to develop a theory which
iii
emancipates social participants from distorted meaning in 
communication in order to restore individual autonomy and 
responsibility free from repression.
Further research revealed intersubjectivity as a 
problem in phenomenological-idealist philosophy, addressed 
in this paper through the writing of Edmund Husserl. This
is the problem of establishing an objectively shared world 
between persons when I can never have the experiences of 
another ego, but can know only my own original experience. 
Husserl attempts to resolve this problem by an empathic 
bridge in transcendental intersubjectivity.
This collapse into transcendentalism led to a further 
excursion into phenomenology and hermeneutics via Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Martin Heidegger. Historical hermeneutics 
situates the individual as always already in the world
without recourse to a transcendental position separate from 
history. This is historical being that is always within
tradition and as such always prejudiced. Tradition is the
context of pre-judgments that orient the subject's action in 
the world. A subject or individual cannot reach an 
objective point from which to discern distortions in com­
munication or institutions, but must recognize that he/she 
is always applying his/her own tradition.
Here then, distortion takes a turn from something to be 
cleansed from communication as in Habermas, ■ to something 
inherent to all human activity and meaning, because human
iv
Being is always distorted, or rather, prejudiced by the 
tradition in which it finds itself.
Thus, intersubjectivity becomes a realm of risk, where 
individual prejudices and claims to possible truths can be 
tested in dialogic communication. The quasi-transcendental 
standards of Habermas which seek to ensure truth are re­
placed by an active hope in the contingency of conversation.
This is not only an incorporation of distortion into 
human activity, but it is also a shift in the locus of 
understanding away from a fixed knowing subject to under­
standing realized in dialogue with others, or decentered 
subjectivity. This grounds the subject in relationships and 
recognizes freedom as an activity that is bound up with 
others as well as nature. Autonomy and responsibility 
become defined in terms of the relationships a person has 
with the world, and not in terms of his/her isolated goals. 
As such, individuality becomes realized in the larger 
intersubjective totality.
I wish to acknowledge the support and critical 
convictions of Ron Perrin, which aided me in beginning this 
project. I owe the depth of my research to James Buchanan, 
who has not only been an incredible source of intellectual 
information, but who has also brought this project alive in 
our many conversations.
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INTRODUCTION
The following presentation will be devoted to inter­
subjectivity, or human community. Intersubjectivity will 
first be addressed as a problematic outgrowth of Cartesian 
egology. We will then follow Edmund Husserl's analysis of 
transcendental subjectivity which he formulates in response 
to this problem. We will then see Husserl's genetic 
constitution of the "ego as a substrate of habitualities" 
contrasted with the ego as historical understanding in the 
work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. With Gadamer, we will see 
understanding unfold as linguistic in character and as an 
historical event. Human beings participating in the event 
of dialogue are thus intersubjective beings.
Part two of this presentation will consist of the 
historical perspective of intersubjectivity as it is 
examined in the work of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas develops 
a theory of undistorted communication for the realization of 
human freedom and autonomy. Habermas sees authority as a 
repressive force in society and a source of distortion. 
This will take us to the work of Gadamer once more as he 
characterizes authority and belief in terms of human 
finitude. Finally we will turn to Paul Ricoeur's analysis 
of ideology and utopia with distortion inherent to the
1
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cultural imagination. This will lead us to the replacement 
of meaning determined by transcendental rules to meaning 
created by active hope.
PART I. INTERSUBJECTIVITY: TRANSCENDENTAL TO HISTORICAL
CHAPTER 1 
HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY
A) Cartesian Subjectivity
Cartesian egology, or subjectivity, finds its origins 
in the Western philosophical tradition of transcendental 
reflection. In Twilight of Subjectivity, Fred Dallmayr 
gives a survey of the idea of subjectivity. The idea of 
subjectivity finds its pronouncement in the Cartesian legacy 
of the "thinking substance."1 Descartes strove to ascertain 
a point of departure from which to arrive at objective 
knowledge. This emphasis on subjectivity elicited "a 
division between 'thinking substance' and 'extended matter' 
or between 'subject' and 'object' of knowledge— a division 
which in due course formed the backbone of both rationalist 
and empiricist perspectives."2 Modern philosophy holds 
subjectivity to be synonymous with theoretical 
consciousness, "construed as a premise for cognition."3 But 
in the modern social and political theory, the 
"cognitive-epistemological ego" is accompanied by the 
"practical, or acting, human subject."4 Thus the "practical 
ego" is elucidated in the traditional notion of
3
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individualism. Dallmayr cites the following passage by Elie 
Halevy regarding the practical ego in individualism:
"In the whole of Europe it is a fact that 
individuals have assumed consciousness of their 
autonomy/ and that every one demands the respect 
of all the others, whom he considers as his 
fellows or equals: society appears, and perhaps
appears more and more, as issuing from the con­
sidered will of the individuals which make it up.
The very appearance and success of individual­
istic doctrines would alone be enough to prove 
that, in Western society, individualism is the 
true philosophy."5
Referring to epistemological individualism, Steven 
Lukes further stresses the notion of the autonomous human 
agent:
Descartes' thought began from this position,
from the individual's certainty of his own 
existence-cogito ergo sum-from which he derives 
knowledge of the external world and the past via 
the transcendental route of assuming God's 
veracity. . . Kant saw the categories as innate in
the (abstract) individual. But the paradigm
epistemological individualist is perhaps the 
empiricist, who holds that (individual) experience 
is the source of knowledge, that all knowledge 
arises within the circle of the individual mink 
and the sensations it receives."6
The stringency of self-determining individualism is 
characterized by Lukes according to the following 
principles: "respect for human dignity, autonomy (or
self-direction), privacy, and self-development," which Lukes 
takes to be derivative of the "ideas of equality and
liberty."7 Dallmayr explicates these ideas of equality and 
liberty as the primary concerns of "practical reason or the 
practical ego, to the extent that they pinpoint the
5
individual's status and role in relation- to other human 
beings and to s o c i e t y . " * *  The "cognitive character" 
associated with individualism is articulated in the 
"abstract individual" who embodies "theoretically
presupposed 'interests, wants, purposes, and needs. "'9
The expeditious method of the Cartesian model, 
utilizing the concept of "thinking substance" and "extended 
matter," was alloyed with the sacred sovereignity of 
Christian monotheism to entrench the schism between man and 
nature as well as between man and man in Western thought and 
practice. The individual, with his theoretically 
presupposed wants, interests, purposes, and needs, acted 
upon non-cognitive, inert nature, in order to obtain 
knowledge and derive meaning for his isolated existence.
This individual with the Cartesian theoretical 
consciousness maintained his subjective autonomy in 
practice. Lukes' description of individualism as a concern 
for self-development and self-direction upholds the ideals 
of equality and liberty. This reflects human community as a 
system of respected rights tailored to fit each individual 
cocoon.
Western man's goal of accounting for the absence of 
reciprocity between subject and object or between human 
agents for determining a mode of being in the world finds 
its counterpart in concrete intersubjectivity, as opposed to 
transcendental intersubjectivity. But it is through this
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realm of transcendental intersubjectivity that we must pass, 
in order to obtain an understanding of the complexity of the 
problem of coming to human community in the world.
B) Husserl's Eidetic Intentionality
It is when the subject or ego is assumed to be a human 
being as a social being existing with other human beings, or 
rather, with Others, that the ontological validity of
subjectivity comes into question. Hence, there is the
problem of inter-subjectivity, or how there can be an
objective world shared with Others, when the world is 
primarily my world, primarily known to me through "cogito," 
or "I think." As ego-cogito, I do not have the originary 
experience of being the cogito of the Other.
Husserl confronts this problem of intersubjectivity by 
using two approaches, the eidetic and genetic constitution 
of experience, respectively. He uses the eidetic, or
transcendental self-constitution as a basis for establishing 
a pure realm of experience. This in turn paves the way for
a presuppositionless science and a pure realm of
intersubjectivity. The eidetic realm provides unprejudiced 
objective reality and the means to communicate this reality 
by providing the common transcendental constitution of 
subjects.
Husserl's later work on genetic constitution, or the
genesis of meaning through time, seeks to explain how
meanings are constituted within intentionality, or the
7
perceptual structure bound within the eidetic constitution. 
Husserl seeks, then, to connect the theoretical 
consciousness of Descartes with the phenomenological world 
that has its own significant existence beyond that of being
merely an object at the mercy of the subject. But at the
same time, he wants to retain the security of pure knowledge 
by making subjective experience a continual referral to the
transcendental realm. It is the inclusiveness of both
subject and object for constituting experience that makes 
the problem of phenomenology one of a self-constituting ego 
that "includes the whole of actual and potential conscious 
life" which "must include all constitutional problems 
without exception. Consequently the phenomenology of this 
self-constitution coincides with phenomenology as a whole."10
Let us begin our sojourn with Husserl by delving into 
his work on eidetic constitution. In order to make fast his
pure realm of self-constitution, Husserl describes the Ego
as a disinterested monad, or being that experiences, in an 
absolute sphere of egological being unaffected by
prejudice. This ahistorical constitution in turn becomes 
the basis for what we will see later as the constitution of 
the Other, or alter ego.
The mainstay of Husserl's eidetic constitution of
experience is his analysis of intentionality. 
Intentionality is the relation between consciousness and 
what consciousness is conscious of. Intentionality is the
8
essential element for any objective knowledge because it 
recognizes the difference between the intending subject and 
the object of intention. Husserl's foremost task is that of 
splicing objective knowledge content with the subjectivity 
of knowing. Husserl asks, "how the an sich of objectivity 
can come to presentation, and thus in a certain extent 
become subjective; what it means, that the object is an sich 
and yet 'given' in knowledge;" and further, "how the 
ideality of the universal (as a concept of Law) can enter 
into the flow of real psychic experiences and become 
something possessed in the knowledge of the man who 
thinks."11 Husserl accepts that we encounter objectivity, 
but he questions how it is possible, and how it can be 
understood.
Husserl investigates this question of the "how?" of 
objectivity by first examining meaning in objectivity. 
Meaning is essential to every theoretical act. There is a 
relationship between meaning and objects such that "every 
expression not only states something, but it also speaks 
about something; it not only has its meaning, but it is also 
referred to certain o b j e c t s . " 1 2
In terms of sense and reference, this is a double 
constitution. There is a meaning that is constituted, or 
sense, and an object that is constituted' as meant, or 
reference, in every objectivating act. The object could be 
a concrete thing, that is, a cup or a dwelling, or
9
fictitious characters or events in narratives or mythology, 
like Anna Karenina or the Sirens in the Odyssey. The 
reference of Anna Karenina is that of an aristocratic matron 
in czarist Russia with the beauty and grace to charm every 
foe.13 The sense of Anna Karenina could be interpreted as 
more than a description of a Russian woman; a figure caught 
in the suicidal binds of Russian morality that ostracized 
those who sought to break with tradition. Intentional 
consciousness grasps what is referred to as well as the 
possible meaning of that object; the Russian woman and the 
meaning of being that Russian woman.
Intentionality has the characteristic of relating 
objects to consciousness, of presenting objects to itself. 
We are aware of a thing in itself through an intentional 
relationship that constitutes objectivity as present to 
consciousness. The objects are not mere sense data intuited 
by our senses as Kant would have it, but rather, objects 
carry the dual constitution of sense and reference. As 
Sokolowski observes, "all intentional acts refer to an 
object, and do so under a certain aspect or sense. This is 
true of perceiving, remembering, evaluating, imagining, 
it is true of all acts which Husserl calls 
'objectivating' a c t s . "14 we are aware of the object 
itself. "I am aware of a single point of reference and a
10
single sense which endures throughout my subjective changes, 
aware of an ‘objectivity1 which transcends my own subjective 
experiences."15
This objectivating act establishes the structure for 
the sense-reference of objects that have meaning and 
objectivity for subjectivity. The objectivating act 
transcends the initial subjective experience. The 
objectivating act is the primary act of consciousness that 
is a purely contemplative act. The object is presented to 
consciousness. There is no evaluation, no emotional 
response, no volition added to this fundamental act. As a 
merely contemplative act, it is free from the influence of 
history and tradition. This sets up an intentional 
relationship to an object with a given sense or aspect, and 
clarifies the object as an object of consciousness. This 
theoretical objectivating act is the basis for rationality 
which is then given to any and all acts built upon it. This 
is Husserl’s unveiling of subjectivity as theoretical 
consciousness with intentionality as the basis for judgment.
It is objectivation that differentiates a rational act 
from instinct or a stimulus-response reaction. The 
clarifying power of the theoretical objectivating act 
enables the subject to "recognize the object of his emotion 
as a reality apart from himself, with meaning or a sense of 
its own."1® The effort of phenomenology is thus to describe 
this reality apart from the subject in such a way that the
11
subject comprehends meaning in its intentional relationship 
with it. This perspective of rational objectivity depicts a 
thinking being who constitutes the meaning of objects within 
an intentional, or objectivating act that transcends 
subjective experience in the world.
Here we have the difference between theoretical and 
practical and evaluating acts. Theoretical acts are given 
priority in importance for discerning knowledge because they 
are not marred by the diverse influences of culture, 
history, psychology, etc. The object is presented in
itself, not as a means or an end for the varied purposes of
human willing, human practice.
In reference to the intentional act itself, Husserl 
states that "it will be immediately understood that the same 
thing that, in reference to the intentional object, is 
called presentation (a perceiving, imagining, or 
representing intention towards it), is called apprehension, 
interpretation, or apperception" in regard to the sensations 
belonging to the a c t . 17 as far as an object may be 
presented to consciousness, it is apperceived by conscious­
ness. The act which recognizes the relation of conscious­
ness with the object, or the interpretation of the object; 
the act which makes consciousness known to itself, is an 
apperception. It is the transcendent move which makes 
consciousness aware that it is itself not one object amongst 
objects, but rather a conscious unity of apperceptions in
12
relation to an object or world separate from itself. The 
intentional essence of an act, its quality and material, 
when joined to the sensory content, forms a complete, 
concrete intentional act.
This relationship between sensory "matter" and 
intentional "form" is the explanation for the subjectivity 
of knowing and the objective content of knowledge. This 
formulation of eidetic constitution may explain the 
structure of meanings as located within intentional acts, 
but not how they are constituted within intentionality.
It is to this question of "how" meanings are wrought 
within intentionality that we now turn. In order to shear
experience of its worldly trappings and deliver it gleaming 
on the doorstep of transcendental reflection, Husserl 
performs a universal method of reduction. By "apprehending 
myself purely; as Ego and with my own pure conscious life," 
the entirety of the Objective world in all of its 
spatiotemporality, any thing belonging to the world is
accepted by me; it exists for me "in that I experience it, 
perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about 
it, value it, desire it."18 This is what Descartes referred 
to as cogito. The world gets its acceptance as existing 
from these cogitationes, or many facets of the cogito. "I 
can enter no world other than the one that gets its sense
and acceptance or status in and from me, myself."!9 But if 
I rise above this admixture of experience and keep from
13
doing any believing about the existence of the world, and 
rather narrow my perspective to regard only this world-life 
in itself, "as consciousness of 'the' world - I thereby 
acquire myself as the pure ego, with the pure stream of my 
cogitationes."20
This is natural being presupposed by transcendental 
being.21 The universal method by which we arrive at 
transcendental being is none other that the transcendental 
epoche, "the transcendental phenomenological reduction."22 
The move from the cogito to pure ego surpasses Descartes' 
transcendental realism by disclaiming his analysis of 
ego-cogito as adequate for an absolute science. Husserl 
maintains that Descartes was on the brink of transcendental 
subjectivity, but failed to enter it because he 
substantiated the ego as a separate human "mens sive animus" 
(mind and spirit) that inferred the rest of the world 
according to its innate principles.23
Husserl's transcendental subject is devoid of any 
indication of world existence, its being or non-being. The 
Ego is untouched by the existence of the world. "The 
reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, 
neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my 
E g o . "24 The Ego is the "acceptance-basis of all Objective 
acceptances and bases, there is no psychological Ego and 
there are no psychic phenomena (as components of 
psychophysical men)."25 The Ego is not included in acts
14
dependent on the world for content; acts of valuing, doing, 
believing. Rather, the Ego "bears within him the world as 
an accepted sense and who, in turn, is necessarily 
presupposed by this sense."26
For Husserl, then, the problem is not one of proving 
being or non-being, that is, making a judgment about 
existence as it is put forth in the statement "I think, 
therefore I am." Husserl moves to screen subjectivity of 
its practical and evaluative activities to reach a realm 
where such activities are accepted in the transcendental 
Ego, and can be constituted in the eidetic structure of 
intentionality. Once this realm is shown to be accessible 
to any and every Ego, this universal realm is able to 
constitute the particularities that drench the canvas of 
concrete subjective experience.
C) Husserl's Genetic Constitution; The Move from 
Transcendental to Temporal Consciousness
In order to constitute the Objective world, Husserl 
needs now to move from the first sense of the ahistorical 
Ego as transcendental subject to the ego as temporal I; the 
second sense of ego. The self-constituting pure Ego is 
first seen as "the flowing cogito." The ego "grasps himself 
not only as a flowing life but also as 1, who live this and 
that subjective process, who live through this and that 
cogito, as the same I."2^ The intentionality of the pure 
Ego polarized objects as "synthetic unities" of meaning in
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actual and possible consciousness. In contrast to the 
indifferent pure Ego, the ego as I is suffused in all 
processes of consciousness, i.e., evaluating, doing, 
desiring; because it is "the active and affected subject of 
consciousness" and as such is related through these 
processes to all "object-poles" constituted in the pure Ego.
These many processes of consciousness are the basic 
turf for revealing and describing the concrete ego, the I. 
Husserl purified the Cartesian ego in transcendental 
subjectivity, and also made the concrete ego as I a 
descriptive method of discerning objective knowledge. The 
cogito can no longer spin yarns of knowledge drawn from the 
bales of sense data to be categorized according to 
principles innate to the ego. Husserl flips over this 
Cartesian ego that gives meaning to objects and shows us an 
ego that accepts the possible meaning of objects for 
consciousness.
Husserl prepares for the constitution of the concrete 
ego through two fundamental structures of intentionality; 
synthesis and temporality. His use of synthesis as 
identification of an objectr and temporality as the allowance 
for the changing appearances of an object signals the shift 
from eidetic to genetic constitution of experience.
Synthesis is a process by which the many perspectives 
that describe an object, for instance; the color of an 
apple, its size, shape, smoothness of surface, the crunch
16
when one bites into it; all of these multiple perspectives 
of apprehending the object are the flow of multiplicities 
which synthesize into an identity, a synthetic unity of the 
object. The cogito intends the cogitatum (in apperception) 
which describes to consciousness an identical u n i t y . 3 0
This takes place within the noematic/noetic structure 
of consciousness.31 Modalities of being, certainly being, 
possible being, or subjective-temporal modes; being present, 
past or future are noematic. The noetic concerns the modes 
of the cogito itself, the modes of consciousness (i.e., 
perception, recollection, retention). The combination of 
the noematic with the noetic serve as a basis for the 
constitution of the concrete ego's objectivating acts. In 
this respect, an apple is given continuously in the 
subjective-temporal mode as being present and the multiple 
ways that the apple is apperceived, or given to 
consciousness, as texture, color or symbol; are synthesized 
so that the object, or in this case the apple, as "'one and 
the same' is intended as a p p e a r i n g . "32 T h e  noetic is the 
endless life of pure consciousness, and the noematic is that 
which is meant, it is the meant w o r l d . 33 This unity or 
identification is described in a synthetic structure of 
intentionality that is "the method for a descriptive 
transcendental-philosophical theory of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "34
This form of synthesis is first encountered as "an 
all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the
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continuous consciousness of internal time."35 Now Husserl 
floods intentionality with the element of temporality, 
bringing the genesis of constitution to the formerly static 
eidetic structure of consciousness.
Husserl cleaves temporality into objective and internal 
time. "Objective temporality that appears" i.e., the 
temporality of this die is distinct from the "internal 
temporality of the appearing," i.e., that of the die 
perceiving. The internal temporality of the appearing
"'flows away' with its temporal extents and phases," the 
continually changing appearances of the die. The unity of 
these multiple appearances is
"a unity of synthesis: not merely as a
continuous connectedness of cogitationes (facets
of the cogito-judgments, values, desires), i.e., 
being stuck together externally, but a 
connectedness that makes the unity of one
consciousness, in which the unity of an
intentional objectivity as 'the same' objectivity
belonging to multiple modes of consciousness
becomes constituted."3®
The cohesive character of internal temporality makes
possible a synthesis of the fecund life of the cogito, and
hence a unified consciousness.
As a result of the transcendental epoche^, the existence
of the die and of the world are bracketed, but "the one
identical, appearing die (as appearing) is continuously
'immanent' in the flowing consciousness, descriptively 'in'
it."37 The object is a being in consciousness not as a part
(that would be in relation to a whole), but "ideally," as
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possible meaning. The object is disclosed "'ideally' as 
something intentional, something appearing . a
being-in-it (consciousness) as its immanent 'objective 
sense.'"38 The object is included in the subjective process 
itself as a sense; it does not come from the outside as a 
closed entity confronting subjectivity. The object is in 
the subjective process "as an 'intentional effect'" produced 
by the synthesis of consciousness. The object is involved 
in many modes of consciousness - in perception, evaluation, 
recollection. The object as meant, as noematic, becomes 
constituted in the noetic modes of consciousness as a 
"unitary consciousness embracing these separated 
processes,"39 and makes an identifiable meaning possible. 
The "all-embracing cogito" of reflection, as synthetic 
conscious life, "is the all-embracing of life itself, with 
its openly endless unity and wholeness."40 The one constant 
within all of these life processes of the ego is their 
temporal ordering "within the constant infinite horizon: 
immanent time. "43-
Now that we have scanned Husserl's method of 
transcendental constitution via intentionality as that of a 
synthesizing of noema and noeisis in immanent time; i.e., as 
objects described in the flowing consciousness, we are 
equipped to hew from the pure Ego the concrete ego as I that 
is constituted as a "substrate of h a b i t u a l i t i e s . "42
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Every action of the ego brings a new objective sense 
and the ego therefore "acquires a new abiding property."43 
As ego, with a certain conviction I decide by an act of 
judgment in favor of a "being-thus" of an object that 
cancels a previous conviction. Up until this point, 
however, the conviction was such that it had been accepted
by me. It was that to which I could "return" repeatedly and
have it as mine. This habitual state of appropriating the
past into the present then determines the ego as ego
convinced. This active generation of habitual properties 
finds the ego participating in "the stream of subjective 
processes." Through this mode of conviction-cancellation 
the ego exhibits in these alterations "an abiding style with 
unity of identity throughout all of them: a personal
character."44 This personal character renders the ego 
concrete. The ego can only be concrete through the 
activities of its flowing intentional life with the objects 
it intends, the objects meant. The intentional constitution 
of an object finds its "existence and being-thus" correlated 
to the "habitually constituted in the Ego-pole himself by 
virtue of his position-taking."4^
The self-constitution of the ego now occurs in a 
"surrounding world" which exists for the ego, and in it, 
objects exist for the ego. Temporality allows the ego to 
make the distinction between those objects with which it is 
acquainted and those not yet encountered. The objects I am
20
acquainted with have been acquired by me through my 
intentionality and synthetic activity of constituting the 
object in the noematic/noetic structure. "My activity of 
positing and explicating being, sets up a habituality of my 
Ego," where the object, with "its manifold determinations is 
mine a b i d i n g l y . " 4 6  These "abiding acquisitions" compose my
surrounding world that includes those objects with which I
am acquainted as well as the horizons of those with which I 
am not acquainted, but are anticipated within the framework 
of habituality.
Thus the historical dimension is woven into Husserl's 
constitution of experience through the woof and warp of 
synthesis and temporality that fabricate genetic 
constitution. The ego is habitually concretized in its 
surrounding world, or "my world." As Sokolowski observes, 
"genetic constitution is not simply deductive explication of 
the content of our concepts; it is the result of a
continually repeated encounter between subjectivity and 
reality . "47 An(j this is the basis for not only the
phenomenology of self-constitution, but for phenomenology as 
a whole.
Husserl's earlier eidetic structure functioned as the 
possibilizing ego, the pure realm to which the de facto 
concrete was reduced by epoche. The perception of objects 
in concrete subjectivity is bracketed, for concrete 
subjectivity is not the acceptance-basis for objective
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knowledge. The practical ego must give way to the 
theoretical ego. This abstention from accepting the object 
as being moves us to the realm of the transcendental ego. 
Here is the realm of possibilities where the actual 
perception of the object is cast amongst the "pure 'eidos' 
perception, whose 'ideal' extension is made up of all 
ideally possible perceptions, as purely phantasiable 
p r o c e s s e s ."48 The epoche has rid the subject of prejudice 
and judgment by exposing it to the all-embracing eidos. The 
object is subject to the principles of the eidos ego; the 
object's relation to rationality (its pure possibility) and 
its thus being made scientific (logical). Recall that the 
object is presented to consciousness in an objectivating act 
that is solely contemplative. This opens up consciousness 
to all possible meanings issuing from the sense of the 
object. Only from this primarily theoretical skeleton of 
meaning that sets up the object as meant can any other acts 
be derived, can there be judgments of knowledge made. 
Husserl's phenomenological reduction or the epoche, and 
"eidetic intuition" or acceptance-basis for meaning, make up 
the "fundamental form of all particular transcendental 
methods," and make science "possible."49
Husserl's quest for a knowledge basis for self and 
world has linked the ahistorical eidetic ego with the 
concrete ego by the temporal constitution of the concrete
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ego as an habitualized ego that posits objective acts as an 
identity, or synthetic unity, in the unified consciousness 
of the I.
The synthetic structure of the eidos is such that it 
allows for the identification of meaning, but also for the 
incompatibilities and contradictions in consciousness 
seeking to understand itself and the w o r l d . 50 This 
absolution of incongruities in the eidetic constitution is 
not applicable to the continual change encountered by the 
subject interacting with reality. Without the genetic 
constitution of the concrete ego, Husserl would have no way 
to deal with the alterity of the temporal world. The eidos
ego would be a worldless ego, because it would not encounter
the world, but absorb the multifarious content of the world 
into its abstract form. The emptiness of the eidos that 
Husserl himself admitted amends itself with the inclusion of 
the habitualized ego that functions in time. But the eidos
is never forfeited; it remains a checkpoint for science and
self.
This fundamental format of the triad of Husserlian 
constitution of experience, the natural being that 
presupposes theoretical being that arrives at genetic being 
is carried over to Husserl's constitution of 
intersubjectivity. The method of reduction to the 
possibilizing sphere of eidos and the descriptive method of 
determining meaning that characterize Husserl's arrival in
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the world as "my world" are also used when Husserl attempts
to account for the existence of the Other, or alter-ego.
D) Husserl's Transcendental Intersubjectivity: The
Transition from Subjective to Objectively Shared World
As we said earlier, the problem of intersubjectivity is 
how there can be an objective world shared with Others when 
the world is primarily my world, primarily known to me 
through cogito. As ego-cogito I do not have the originary 
experience of being the cogito of the Other. The syntheses 
in my intentionality which give rise to my uniquely 
habituated ego are not the same as the Other's. Husserl
attempts to solve this situation of concrete alterity
through the transcendental community of egos.
Transcendental subjectivity is disengaged from particular 
being in the concrete world. Therefore, if one were to 
establish a transcendental realm of intersubjectivity, one 
would have the starting-point for an objectively shared 
world, for human community. Thus, Husserl is in keeping 
with the tradition that upholds theoretical consciousness as 
the mode of understanding and discerning knowledge. Husserl 
alleviates the silence forced upon the object world in his 
analysis of intentionality that recognized the possible 
meaning of the object for consciousness. His descriptive 
phenomenology retains the dignity of the object as more than 
"extended matter" at the service of the "thinking substance" 
of Descartes. But he is faithful to the idea of human being
24
as reflective being over and above the seething cauldron of 
cultural influence and beyond the tentacles of tradition.
How, then, does one establish a community of reflective 
beings? Husserl begins by working out the problem in terms 
of the separate existence of ego and alter-ego.
The spatio-temporal separation of each existence is 
paralleled by the mental separation of each psyche. I 
cannot physically verify the mental existence of the Other, 
as I can their bodily presence. I can touch your body, but 
not your mind. The anticipation of the Other's 
consciousness can only be made in a realm of transcendence, 
beyond the physical, in a realm of pure being. It is this 
abundance of abstract psyches, or transcendental 
subjectivities, that Husserl wants to agglomerate into a 
transcendental community of subjects by means of 
phenomenological reduction, or bracketing of relations with 
the concrete world. This transcendental realm provides a 
medium for an empathic bridge from one ego to another, or 
alter-ego; from subject to Other. Therefore, from our 
shared absolute presence we can "intuit" the presence of the 
Other, and establish a basis for an objectively shared 
world, or community.
Because the mental life of the Other is not an 
originary experience, as is that of his/her body for me,
"the possibility that any other consciousness 
posited by me in empathic experience, does not in 
fact exist cannot be compellingly refuted by any
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experience of mine. My own empathic experience,
however, is absolutely and originarily given in
the stream of my immanent perception. Empathic
evidence thus excludes, in principle, originary
verification."51
Thus, mutual understanding via empathy is at least 
possible in principle among ego-subjects, without recourse 
to the arbitrary world of experience. Here we have a 
conduit for the sharing of "factual separate worlds of 
experience" that form an intersubjective world. This is the 
"universal extension of the human community reduced to pure 
consciousness and the pure I."52 My former inability to 
grasp the Other in concrete existence becomes possible in 
transcendental intersubjectivity by means of empathy.
This is accomplished through a reduction to the ownness 
sphere of the ego. It is the reflection of the I as an I, 
an ego, which recognizes itself as "me," a "my own" that 
enables the ego to delineate that which is not my own, but 
rather that which is alien, or Other. "Thus, I first 
constitute the sense 'ego,' and then I transfer the sense 
'alter-ego' to the Other."53
Now that we have become familiar with the initial 
concern of the problem of an objectively shared world and 
the constitution of the Other, let us return to the ego as 
intentional subjectivity and develop the "factual separate 
world of experience" of the subject.
As an ego, my separate world of experience is that 
where "existents have sense for me only by virtue of the
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operating intentionality of my conscious life and its 
constitutive synthesis."54 This aspect of intentionality is 
derived from Husserl's genetically constituted 
"personalistic attitude," or the sensual orientation of the 
body within the spatio-temporal world.
The naturalistic attitude is fundamental Nature, the 
reality of material things and the reality of the psyche. 
Animated bodies, those of animals and human beings, have 
"localized sensibility; all consciousness is founded upon 
the body, localized upon it, and co-ordinated with it in 
time."55 Bodies are embedded in substantial causal Nature, 
and with consciousness coming from the sensibility of the 
body, the "cogito" is then a "fact of nature."
We now make the transition from material subjectivity 
in Nature to subjectivity as the existence of the psyche as 
spirit, as active ego. Husserl's spiritual realm is the 
personalistic attitude, which is; "the everyday life among 
our fellow-men with whom we are connected in manifold 
relationships."56 a  person is a subject in an environment, 
where he/she is actively involved in the world by 
apperceiving, remembering, believing, etc., this world. The 
person develops a "theoretical or practical or evaluating 
attitude" towards this personal environment which exists for 
him/her. The theoretical, or contemplative act is given 
primacy over the practical and evaluative because it is the 
basis for scientific knowledge and rational
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decision-making. As you will recall, the practical and 
evaluative are derived from the theoretical; the universal 
that gives credence to the particular.
This personal environment becomes the objective reality 
of the person. It is a world for the person, not a world in 
itself, and not the world of any arbitrary person, but a 
personal world for someone who must know of it through 
actual apperception, or recognition, or at least have it in 
the horizon ready to be apperceived. In the words of Schutz:
"It is a world experienced by the person in 
his intentional experiences as having a particular 
meaning structure which . . .  is always changing 
and subject to modification by cancellation and 
regrouping of meaning contents . . . the personal
environment is always in a state of becoming."57
This is a more historically explicit - because it entails
futurity and the implied past - account of Sokolowski's
statement that genetic constitution is a repeated encounter
between subject and reality. The personal environment is
the world as it is originally perceived, but develops and
changes as the concrete I is actively involved in continual
apperception and the development of theoretical and
practical evaluations.
The naturalistic attitude would regard the things of
the world as stimulus upon the being as a causal
relationship. (Hence, the naturalistic attitude is
pre-theoretical, pre-reflective.) In the personalistic
attitude, the causal relation gives way to a system of
motivations. "The noematic unities called 'things as
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apprehended by the personal I' are starting points of more 
or less strong tendencies attracting the subject to turn to 
them in practical, cognitive, evaluating, etc. a c t s . "58 The 
I finds itself motivated by these tendencies in its actions 
or its passive endurance of them.
Thus we have the intentional relationship of the 
subject or ego towards the world. This spiritual ego, or 
active concrete I, is subject to the laws of motivation in 
which the interconnected experiences of space, time, and 
causality are dissolved. Consciousness is then a unity of 
motivations.
"The motivations may be of different types:
(1) motivations of reason, that is motivations of 
act b£ acts which stand under the jurisdiction of 
reason, as in the case of logical reasoning where 
I bestow my doxic thesis (opinion) upon the 
conclusion 'in consequence of' having bestowed it 
upon the premises; or (2) motivations by
association and habit, that is, relations between 
earlier and later experiences within the same
stream of consciousness, in which case the 
motivating experiences may be sedimentations of
previously performed reasonable acts or even
perfectly unreasonable ones, imposed upon us; they 
may be distinct or hidden, eventually even
"unconscious" within the meaning of
psychoanalysis."59
The bridge between myself and others, Husserl's
empathic leap, presupposes the Other as a spiritual I in a
personalistic environment in which the Other acts and reacts 
by reason and habit. These laws of motivation are the 
foundation for the comprehension of other human beings who 
are subject to these laws as I myself am. The body and
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bodily movements of the Other, as physical objects and
events which articulate a meaning-structure, indicate the
expression of "the Other's spiritual I to whose motivational 
meaning content I am directed. Empathy in other persons is
nothing else but that form of apprehension which grasps this
m e a n i n g . "60 Through the apperception of the Other we
apprehend the Other's meaning-content. Thus we are able to 
make an intuitive empathic leap from my ownness sphere to
the Other. Empathy becomes the breaking ground for the
"We," or community of human beings, or transcendental
intersubjectivity.
The abstraction of the ego as ownness is carried out
from the naturalistic attitude of a body in the world, my
owned body in owned nature, through the personalistic 
attitude of my own apperception of the world for me in my 
own theoretical and practical attitudes and evaluations; my 
own intentional I. The incarnate structure of my ownness is
centered in my body, through which I can exercise my powers; 
my sensibility for seeing, touching, hearing, etc. The
embodied I is the "terminus of a purification and the
departure point for a constitutional performance."61 The
embodied I is a composite of potential and horizons that 
demand a "coming to awareness of the 'owned' (which 
penetrates a life whose wealth exceeds reflection."62 The
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fully experiencing cogito as a concrete monad reveals the 
abundance of human being beyond that of a mere "thinking 
substance."
Now we turn from the constitution of the consciousness
of the I to the constitution of the consciousness of the 
Thou; the other, the alien that is not my own. As has 
already been indicated, Husserl makes the leap from the ego 
to the alter-ego by empathy. This is an act of imagining an 
Other beyond my ownness sphere, or rather, imagining an 
alter-ego with consciousness thru analogical pairing.
The "analogical grasping of the Other” embraces "the 
two requirements of phenomenology: respect for the
otherness of the Other and the rooting of this experience of 
transcendence 'in' primordial experience."63 Thru analogy, 
there is a reach beyond the ownness sphere, beyond 
solipsism, while preserving the originary experience of the 
ego.
Because I cannot experience the Other in the original,
for then he/she would be an extension of me, the Other is 
experienced as an appresentation through his/her body. This 
harks back to Schutz’s analysis of the Other whose bodily 
movements indicate a meaning-structure that can be 
apprehended by me. The bodily movements and body that are 
appresented indicate the spiritual I, or incarnate existence 
of the Other.
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This analogy of body to body makes it possible for the 
"signification ego" to move "from my body . . .  to the body 
of the Other, which appresents another life to me."64 The 
here of "ego" is moved to the there of the Other, as 
alter-ego. The alter-ego is "seen as" the ego thru an act 
of the imagination.
The analogy of ego to alter-ego is of a particular 
breed. It goes from the originary to the non-originary, not 
merely from object to object in an original sphere of 
experience. "This 'pairing' brings it about that the sense 
of the one refers to the sense of the other, is transposed 
or transferred to the second."66
This first moment of pairing by analogue is followed by 
the constitution of the Other through my deciphering of the 
expression of behavior or expressive signs by the Others. 
We have already discussed this in terms of the apprehension 
of meaning-structures. This second moment "fills in" the 
empty analogue of pairing with the possibility of a being 
that has meaning for me.
This possibility for meaning brings us to the third 
moment of imagining "if I were over there." Thru this act 
of the imagination, the Other is a potential experience for 
me. There is no consciousness of the Other that I can 
perceive (I can only apperceive the Other's existence), but 
this potential experience can be filled by my own creations 
of my imagination. "The fiction is this liberation from my
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perspective and this movement into another point of 
view."®® By imagining another perspective, I establish the 
Other as an intending alien life, distinct from me but an 
intentional nexus as I am. I see the Other as I see myself.
But Husserl ends his empathic exposition by recognizing 
the sphere of the Other as mutually exclusive from my own 
sphere. The Husserlian project of transcendental
intersubjectivity is maintained as a community of monads.
"According to the idealistic requirement of 
constitution, the Other must be a modification of 
my ego and according to the realistic character of 
description, the Other never ceases to exclude 
himself from the sphere of 'my monad'"®?
As an intending subject, the ego experiences the Other
by analogy, signification and imagination. This experience
is essentially enigmatic because "my here and the over there
of the Other are mutually exclusive."®® There remains a gap
in the intersubjective realm, transcendentally and
concretely. There is a gap between persons, physically and
as separate consciousnesses.
We have been propelled by two thrusts of thought in our
study thus far. On the one hand, we have developed the
existence of the eidetic ego in relation to the world
primarily as an I am, therefore I think,®® or embodied
consciousness in the world. We have shown the existence of
the Other as an alter-ego by making the empathic move of the
imagination thru pairing the ego and alter-ego in a
transcendental realm of absolute egos. This provided the
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scaffolding for Husserl's community of monads that are 
mutually exclusive in transcendental subjectivity.
On the other hand, we have substantiated the subject as 
an intentional nexus, who acts and interacts in the sensual 
world. This subject forms attitudes, values, desires and 
beliefs about the world, making consciousness a matter of 
the events that occur in the world. This genetic, or 
habituated ego is a motivated subject that apperceives the 
world through an ongoing "stream of consciousness" of 
earlier and later experiences that become sedimentations.
But in the transcendental community, the ego and 
alter-ego remain mutually exclusive. And in the concrete 
the subject experiences the Other from the edge of the gap 
that remains between the here and the over there of the 
other. Not only transcendentally, but concretely, 
intersubjectivity remains an enigma. Husserl is caught in a 
catch-22 of egological reflection.
CHAPTER 2 
GADAMER'S HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS
Hans-Georg Gadamer criticizes Husserl's concept of 
empathy for its unrelenting focus upon the "interiority of 
self-consciousness" in which empathy "fails to achieve the 
orientation towards the functional circle of life, which 
goes far beyond consciousness, to which, however, it claims 
to r e t u r n . "70 what Gadamer beckons is not a further 
analysis of community that is essentially a modification of 
reflective self-understanding, but a retraction of Husserl's 
claim that only a pure realm of thought is a legitimate 
basis for knowledge and understanding. Gadamer is 
backtracking to the pre-reflective natural world in which 
the ego exists. Empathy as a transcendental bridge is a 
necessary conjuration for beings alienated from their 
natural environment, but an unsuccessful conjuration.
A) Heidegger: Intersubjectivity as Being-in-the-world
Heidegger jars this empathic keystone from the 
transcendental portal and plops it amidst the "unsociable" 
"dominant modes of Being-with." Heidegger interprets 
empathy as a suppression of genuine understanding, such that 
"Being-with-one-another and Dasein's knowing of itself are
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led astray."71 (&n example would be the identification of a
person with their occupation - someone is regarded only as a 
manager and not also as a musician or parent.) Dasein's 
(human there-being) Being-towards Others is "an autonomous, 
irreducible relationship of Being," but also, as Being-with, 
"is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is."72 
Therefore Dasein-with is "a kind of Being which entities 
encountered within-the-world have as their own. So far as 
Dasein jls at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind 
of B e i n g . " 7 2  Dasein-with is ontologically prior to empathy, 
for only because there is already a Being-with is empathy 
possible. Empathy does not constitute Being-with. It gets 
its motivation from the "unsociable" dominant modes of 
Being-with. Heidegger takes care to note that Dasein-with 
cannot be construed as a summation of subjects. This 
numerical treatment of Dasein is "inconsiderate" and does 
not take Others seriously because it does not want "to have 
anything to do with them."
This description of empathy that suppresses genuine 
understanding changes the tack of intersubjectivity as a 
transcendental ideal for concrete being to a mode of 
Being-in-the-world. Genuine understanding is a realization 
of this Being-in-the-world. "Understanding is not a last 
methodological ideal of philosophy over against the naivete 
of unreflecting life." It is, on the contrary, the 
"original form of the realisation of There-being, which is
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Being-in-the-world."74 Before understanding is dispersed 
into the various directions of pragmatic or theoretical 
interest, it is There-being's mode of Being that is 
potentiality-for-being and possibility. Possibility is now 
located in the world, and not the eidos.
Heidegger inverts Husserl's conception of 
understanding, i.e., understanding as an achievement of the 
possibilizing eidos. There is not a theoretical
understanding, a separate evaluative understanding; an 
understanding for the many attitudes one could take 
according to Husserl. Transcendental reflection is not the 
mother of understanding that eventually confirms or denies 
the existence, or being of the objective world. Heidegger 
topples the regal eidos with his own view of understanding 
as an act which is itself the movement beyond Being. This 
is Being as projection, or thrownness. The understanding 
that is potentiality-for-Being is transcendence, "of moving 
beyond b e i n g . " 7 5
Heidegger develops Being as historical in its 
potentiality-for-Being. History is seen not so much as a 
past, but as something that has effects in the present, or 
"now." "Anything that has a history stands in the context 
of a becoming."76 Anything which has a history shows itself 
as that which makes a history, and indicates a future in the 
present. In this sense, "'history' signifies a 'context' of 
events and 'effects,1 which draws on through 'the past,'
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the 'Present,' and the 'futures,' On this view, the past 
has no special priority."77
History is the totality of these events and effects 
which operate in time. Heidegger poses the question whether 
Dasein is already present, i.e., has absolute, contained 
being, which can get "into a history," or is it that "Dasein 
is historical in its Being?"?® In the latter mode, Dasein 
must concern itself with the essential nature of projection 
and thrownness, or becoming; the "now" and the "then." Thus 
Dasein is concerned with temporality, or "the mode of 
making-present which retains and awaits."79 "Then" has a 
future reference in which something is to happen "then." 
This implies that something is previous the "then," or that 
there is a "beforehand." The reference to the past is that
which "has failed or eluded us 'on that former occasion'." 
What occurred "on that former occasion" is "something we 
must 'now' make up f o r . "80
Heidegger puts these three modes of events in a 
conception of time focusing on the Present. "Then" is thus 
an awaiting; "on that former occasion" a retaining, and
"now" a making present. The "then" carries within it the
not-now-yet. And within the "on that former occasion" is 
the now-no-longer. These explanations of temporality are
described in terms of "now," in relation to the Present, 
i.e., not-now-yet, now-no-longer. "Temporality ensnares 
itself in the Present."81 Time is seen from the perspective
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of what is "now"; "on that former occasion" is what was
"earlier" than now, and "then" is what is "later on." Seen
thus, temporality rotates on the axis of now, the Present, 
as a "unity with awaiting and retaining."82
However, Heidegger emphasizes the "then" as a "then, 
when . . . ," the "on that former occasion" as a "on that
former occasion, when . . . ," and the "now" as a "now, that
. . . " ("jetzt, da . . ."). This places the "then," "on 
that former occasion," and "now" in a "relational structure 
which we call 'datability.'"83 a s  a datable event, the 
"now" is given the status of a point in time. "The 'now' is 
time."84 what this datability shows is the "now" that makes 
present is the "now, that . . .," the "now, there (da)
. . .," the clearing in Being. Something defined as a "now 
that" is an identification of an event that is time, 
there-being which is time.
"In the 'now that . . . ' lies the ecstatical 
character of the Present. The datability of the 
'now,' the 'then,' and the 'on that former 
occasion,' reflects the ecstatical constitution of 
temporality, and is therefore essential for the 
time itself that has been expressed. The 
structure of the datability of the 'now,' the 
'then,' and the 'on that former occasion,' is 
evidence that these, stemming from temporality, 
are themselves time."85
The "now," "then," and "on that former occasion" are the way
of "assigning a t i m e . "86
By assigning a time, there is another mode of viewing
time, which is the "until-then," the "meanwhile" and
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"awaiting," which leaves a space that is "in-between" the 
"now" and the "then," or "in-between" the "now" and the "on
that former occasion." Thus there is a "span" in which the
making-present is "ecstatically stretched along," as
historical t e m p o r a l i t y . 8 7
In this mode of being stretched along, Dasein is
"living along" in an everyday manner, but does not
understand itself as "running along in a Continuously
/
enduring sequence of pure 'nows.' By reason of this 
covering up, the time which Dasein allows itself has gaps in
it."88 This is not to say that these gaps splinter time
into random pieces, but rather that in its continuity, 
temporality is made up of "nows" that have been disclosed 
and stretched along ecstatically. This is the historical 
dimension of temporality as an authentic "constancy of
Self."89
What Heidegger has done is "unsnared" temporality from 
the Present. The "now" is contextualized as a succession of 
points of time, where the "now" is time. The "now," which 
is a making present, is the clearing in Being, or the "now, 
that . . the identification of an event, of an entity
which is "there." Being is thus a succession of "nows," or
events, and the gaps between the "nows." Being is that
which is making present in relation to that which was and
that which is to be. Being is that which is Present and
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that which is not-present, or the gaps in Being from which 
"nows" are disclosed in the "there" of Being.
Thus, Gadamer can say that for Heidegger, Being itself 
is time. This counters the traditional relegation of Being 
to the transcendental level which showed Being as what is 
present. Heidegger released Being from its transcendental 
constraints by declaring a "there" in Being; "a clearing in 
being, i.e., a distinction between Being and beings."90 
This fundamental distinction in Being brings the question of 
nothingness to the fore, because now Being may be 
not-present, and possible, like time.
Thus understanding is the realization of possibility, 
for it is There-being's mode of Being. The existence of the 
clearing in Being, or of There-being leads Heidegger to an 
investigation into Being itself. Husserl was concerned with 
finding a basis for knowledge in the human sciences whereas 
Heidegger is concerned with a "hermeneutics of f a c t i c i t y . "91
Facticity is the problem of the interrelatedness of 
Dasein with all that it encounters in its own world. As 
existing in the world, Dasein defines this existence as a 
Fact. "Whenever Dasein is, it is a Fact."92 As 
within-the-world, Dasein has Being-in-the world that is 
"bound up in its 'destiny'" with the Being of other entities 
in the world. Thus, a hermeneutics of facticity is a 
continual interpretation of the relations of Dasein with 
other entities of Being. It is an interpretation of the
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events, or situations which Dasein finds itself and through 
which it comes to understand itself.
As possibility, understanding moves from the idealist 
position of synthesizing perceptions that determine what is 
present objectively and therefore determine that which has 
being; to the act of understanding as an event of 
interpreting meaning coming from the object in There-being 
and meaning brought ■to this event in the forestructures of 
understanding belonging to the interpreter. Heideggerian 
understanding embraces the historical nature of 
understanding as an event that includes the fore-structures, 
or prejudices of the interpreter. He provides an opening 
for the meaning of Being that does not blanch understanding 
to purify it of subjective experience. Heidegger immerses 
understanding in the whole of being-in-the-world.
B) Gadamer: Understanding as Historical Event
Understanding that is an event in the world becomes a 
central element for Gadamer's hermeneutics of experience. 
He demonstrates understanding as more than a theoretical act 
in his example of human practice. When someone learns how 
to use a machine, knows a trade, or has an understanding of 
artifacts, "it still remains true that . . . (this is)
ultimately a self understanding."93 Understanding requires 
not only what is presented immediately, but also the 
disclosure of what is hidden in expression, in human 
activity. This means that a person "knows one's way in it
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. . . a person who understands, understands himself,
projecting himself according to his possibilities."94
Understanding is an ongoing projection of human action, 
not a product of identification with which to dub reality. 
Understanding is a movement in history, not an adequation of 
intellect and reality. According to Graf-York, this 
historicality depends upon the "generic difference between 
the ontic and the historical." The knower and the known are 
not "present-at-hand in an 'ontic' way, but in an 
'historical' one," ontic as an emphasis on what is as static 
present. Our study of history rests on our being 
"historical." "The historicalness of human There-being in 
its expectancy and its forgetting is the condition of our 
being able to represent the past."95
What is brought into perspective here is the difference 
between a "correspondence" and "similarity" for scientific 
method.95 Correspondence characterizes understanding as a 
reproductive process, where knowledge from the past carries 
the same meaning when it is reproduced in the present. 
Correspondence implies the idealist notion of pure concept 
unattached to contingent subjective influences. Thus, 
correspondence is inherently ahistorical.
Similarity, on the other hand, bursts this bubble of 
pure knowledge because it acknowledges the involvement of 
human There-being as past and possible in the act of 
understanding. This historical dimension makes knowledge
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incapable of being reproduced; it can only be re-presented. 
The interpretation of what it means in the present can only 
be a similarity, at best, of what it meant in the past, 
because understanding always includes the forestructures 
that influence' how we interpret things.
Correspondence is not included as "a condition of the 
original meaning of historical interest" because only when 
correspondence admits tradition can it be "as original and 
essential a part of the historical finiteness of There-being 
as is its projectedness towards future possibilities of
itself. Heidegger was right to insist that what he called 
•Thrownness' belongs together with that which is
p r o j e c t e d . u n d e r s t a n d i n g  becomes more of a productive 
interpretation of things because of its inherent 
possibilizing structure of There-being.
This historical understanding will be incorporated by 
Gadamer in his theory of an historical hermeneutics. He 
applies Heidegger's structure of There-being that is thrown 
projection to his concept of concrete hermeneutics.
There-being realized in understanding is concretized in 
historical understanding. This occurs because "the 
commitments of custom and tradition and the corresponding 
potentialities of one's own future become effective in 
understanding itself."98 &s such, There-being has always
"been," in relation to its potentiality-for-being. This is
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the meaning of the existential of "Thrownness," or being 
that is continually interpreted.
Gadamer contrasts this hermeneutics of facticity with 
Husserl's transcendental constitution:
"no freely chosen relation towards one's own
being can go back beyond the facticity of this 
being. Everything that makes possible and limits 
the project of There-being precedes it, 
absolutely."99
Working from this position of natural historical being that 
understands without the epoche, Gadamer's project is to
develop the existential structure of There-being expressed 
"in the understanding of historical tradition."
What this does for intersubjectivity is offer a shared 
objective reality not in terms of an absolutely constituted 
realm, but in terms of a factical hermeneutics that locates 
intersubjectivity in-the-world. The ontology of
intersubjectivity is not founded in transcendental 
subjectivity where it is identified in the concept of
intuitive empathy. Intersubjectivity is shaken awake by
Heidegger's Being-with in the actual historical world. The 
ontological relevance of Being-with is that
"the 'subject character' of one's own Dasein
and that of Others is to be defined existentially 
that is, in terms of certain ways in which one 
may be. In that which we concern ourselves
environmentally the Others are encountered as what
they are; they are what they do."100
Here activity defines ontology as relationships in the
world, and ontology becomes a matter of the interpretation
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of ways of being-in-the-world, or Being-with-Others. What 
we are developing is intersubjectivity as a hermeneutics of 
experience, and as we shall see later with Gadamer, a 
linguistic hermeneutics, or interpretation of experience.
The methodological basis for Gadamer's hermeneutics of 
experience is the constant interplay of understanding and 
interpretation as perceived by Heidegger. The task of
hermeneutics is "never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, 
and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and 
popular conceptions," but to secure a scientific theme by
working out said forestructures "in terms of the things 
themselves."101 This is the Cerberean hermeneutic circle
that resists the habits of thought that obliterate the
possible meanings of the things-themselves.
By focusing upon the thing, for example, a stanza of 
poetry, the interpreter ceases to accommodate the 
distractions arising from his/her own fore-understanding. 
In trying to understand the text, the interpreter engages in 
an act of projecting. He/she projects a meaning for the 
entire text when there is a discovery of some initial
meaning. This "initial meaning" occurs only because the
interpreter has an expectation of meaning for the text. 
Thus, working out this projection of fore-understanding with 
what is really there becomes a task of revision and
understanding the text. This is the continual "process of 
new projection" that is "the movement of understanding and
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interpretation."102 objectivity is then a result of this 
working-out of meaning that is given to the text by the 
interpreter and that meaning emerging from the text itself.
Gadamer takes into account the possibility of 
misunderstanding a text, seen as a contradiction in 
meanings. "how can misunderstandings of a text be 
recognized at all if there is nothing else to 
contradict?"10^ Misunderstanding implies meaning that has 
its source in an other besides the interpreter. He deals 
with this possibility by taking an attitude of openness 
towards the meaning of the text or person. This requires 
putting ourselves in relation to the other within a medium 
of meanings as possibilities rather than an equation of 
meanings between the two. Fore-meanings and expectations 
are submitted to the event of understanding that includes 
that which the text may be telling the interpreter. What is 
important is the awareness of one's own bias; of one's own 
fore-meanings and prejudices "so that the text may present 
itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own 
truth against one's own fore-meanings."104
Thus, there is a tension between given and possible? 
between the past and the possible, between prejudice and the 
possible. This is what gives historical hermeneutics its 
significance. The idea of prejudice in Gadamer is not 
placed in an unfavorable light that reveals superficial 
scars and bruises inflicted upon the face of knowledge.
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This is the light of the enlightenment; the belief in 
legitimate knowledge as perfect knowledge freed from 
prejudice by reason, or the "prejudice against prejudice."
C) Gadamer's Concept of Prejudice and Tradition
For Gadamer, it is our history of prejudice that 
illuminates the worn face of finitude from within our 
concrete experience. Prejudice is not subject to corrective 
measures of reason that seek to perfect humanity. But 
rather, reason and prejudice mesh in an acceptance of the 
unpredictability of historical being. Reason does an 
about-face, so to speak. Instead of working to discredit 
prejudice under the illusion of absolute knowledge, "reason 
exists for us only in concrete, historical terms, i.e., it 
is not its own master, but remains constantly dependent on 
the given circumstances in which it operates."105 we belong 
to history, it does not belong to us. This is why Gadamer 
observes that to focus upon self-reflecting subjectivity for 
knowledge of experience is an inadequate approach. 
Self-understanding is accomplished in a context; in a 
family, a society, a state in which we live. Individuality 
is only a parcel of the larger experience of historical 
life. "The prejudices of the individual, far more than his 
judgments, constitute the historical reality of his 
being."106
Reason that is situated in history is important for the 
idea of prejudice in two respects, that of authority and
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that of tradition. The problem of legitimate prejudice 
initially was, for the enlightenment, a problem of not using 
one's own reason and bowing before the sovereign old 
authority which determined knowledge. The dilemma contains 
more than the prestige of authority replacing individual 
judgment. It also holds the possibility that authority can 
be a "source of truth."107 According to Gadamer, authority 
is an acquisition of knowledge, of superior knowledge? which 
indicates not a narrow view, as the enlightenment would have 
it, but a broader perspective that can be presented by a 
person as well as substantiated by "solid grounds offered by 
reason."108 This formulates objective prejudices, and not 
solely arbitrary assertions reverberating from a stolid 
dictatorship of authority.
From this latter notion of authority as acquired 
knowledge comes the concept of tradition as a form of 
authority. Gadamer calls tradition a brand of authority 
that is "nameless." Our finite historical being is 
characterized by the fact that "the authority of what has 
been transmitted - and not only what is clearly grounded - 
has power over our attitudes and behavior."109 He cites the 
validity of morals as a case in point. Morals are "freely 
taken over, but by no means created by a free insight or 
justified by themselves. This is precisely what we call 
tradition: the ground of their validity. " H O
49
Gadamer refutes the romanticist bias that sees 
tradition as equated with nature and opposed to reason. 
Tradition is not an unquestioned part of our conditioning. 
Tradition incorporates freedom and history in the act of 
preservation, the act of reason, because tradition needs to 
be "affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, 
preservation, such as is active in all historical change 
. . . preservation is as much a freely-chosen action as 
revolution and renewal.11111
In contradistinction to the idealist position that 
designates self-understanding as a result of reflection, 
Gadamer states that
"we stand always within tradition, and this 
is no objectifying process, i.e., we do not 
conceive of what tradition says as something 
other, something alien. It is always part of us, 
a model or exemplar, a recognition of ourselves 
which our later historical judgment would hardly 
see as a kind of knowledge/ but as the simplest 
preservation of tradition."112
Understanding is an opening that allows tradition a voice in
determining the meaning of what we are examining. And it is
through this continual process of bringing to bear the
authority of tradition, or reasoned preservation upon the
act of understanding that creates a proving ground for the
validity of what is true and hence creates the possibility
for historical knowledge.113
With this possibility of understanding something as
true comes the hermeneutical project of reaching agreement
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concerning the content of what it is we are attempting to 
understand, of the thing before us. The fusion of past and 
present in tradition from which meaning can spring is 
understanding's claim to objective validity, "which is not a 
mysterious communion of souls, but a sharing of a common 
meaning."114 And it is the nature of this "common meaning" 
that is significant for the hermeneutic project.
Historical understanding does not require, then, a
reduction to a transcendent subjectivity in order to 
constitute meaning. Understanding can achieve objective 
meaning through agreement of content in historical facticity 
through the "interplay of the movement of tradition and the 
movement of the interpreter.nll5
This kind of agreement demands a different orientation 
of the subject towards the world than that offered by 
Cartesian egology which places man as the axis of all 
knowledge. Here the subject is forced to leave the 
official's post and enter the field of play.
D) Gadamer's Concept of Play
Gadamer's concept of play is critical for historical
understanding because of its diminution of the importance of 
the knowing subject by involving that which is more than the 
subject. "Play fulfills its purpose only if the player
loses himself in his play. The mode of being of play does
not allow the player to behave towards play as if it were an 
object."11^ The intention of play is the "to and fro
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movement which is not tied to any goal which would bring it 
to an end."11? The definition of a game is so dependent 
upon this movement that it does not matter who or what 
performs this movement. Play is this movement of the game.
The involvement of the player is that of deciding 
amongst the possibilities realized in the play. The freedom 
of decision carries with it the element of risk in the game 
itself that could prove dangerous. "One can only play with 
serious possibilities. This means that one may become so 
engrossed in them that they outplay and prevail over one 
. . . all playing is a being-played."118 Thus the lure of
the game is its mastery over the players. In the game, the 
player is spellbound, being drawn into play and kept there. 
The enjoyment of play is dependent upon the "freedom of 
playing himself out," whereby he is "transforming the aims 
of his behavior into mere tasks of the game."119 Hence, the 
purpose of the game lies not in the solution of the task, 
but rather in "the ordering and shaping of the movement of 
the game itself."120
The movement of play that draws a player into a
"reality that surpasses him" characterizes the movement of 
tradition and interpreter. This is an infinite process of 
discovering new meaning in the "place between strangeness 
and familiarity," or the tension that is the "home of
hermeneutics.nl21
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We no longer have a gap between monads but a clearing 
in being where the tension between the meanings of texts or 
persons is "played out." A hermeneutics of inter­
subjectivity demonstrates "the effectivity of history within 
understanding itself," or effective-history, in the story 
told by each person, in the language that gives rise to 
m e a n i n g . 122 This effective-history bears in it the 
commitments of tradition that have been preserved by reason 
in understanding. Thus, authority is manifested in 
understanding as the "having been" of the person's 
experience, and by implication supports the "to be" that is 
the possible meaning that is disclosed in the "playing out" 
of discourse.
Now that we have moved intersubjectivity into history, 
let us continue with the task of discerning meaning from the 
hermeneutic situation. This "situation is one of 
effective-historical reflection," in that "to exist 
historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be 
c o m p l e t e . "123 The substantial subject that is historically 
pre-given simultaneously limits and prescribes the 
possibility of understanding in tradition.
From this general orientation of limitation, Gadamer 
develops the limit of possibility of vision in a situation, 
or a horizon of a situation. "The horizon is the range of 
vision that includes everything that can be seen from a 
particular vantage point."124 The concept of horizon
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includes a dialectic of the finitude and the expansion of 
thought. A horizon characterizes "the way in which thought
is tied to its finite determination, and the nature of the
law of the expansion of the range of vision."125 Horizon is 
then a constant working-out, or rather playing-out of the 
limits of tradition that are brought to the hermeneutic 
experience. This opens into the possibility of broadening 
and enriching the tradition of the interpreter with what is 
offered up by what is being examined.
Horizon is the finite flux of experience; a recognition 
of what is that has been substantiated with what was as well
as the possibility of what might be. The experience of the
horizon is a testing-ground for our prejudices. 
Understanding "is always the fusion of these horizons which 
we imagine to exist by themselves."126 This fusion is not 
an assimilation, but a tension between the text and the 
present. The movement of horizon as simultaneous projection 
and removal in understanding hence formulates the problem of 
application.
The hermeneutical triad of understanding, 
interpretation and application is Gadamer's platform for 
establishing interpretation as the "explicit form of 
understanding," that makes understanding always an 
interpretation, and interpretative language an "inner 
structural element of understanding."
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Before we enter into a discussion of language, let us 
recall that the significance of prejudice is to be aware of 
one's own bias. This allows the newness and possible 
meanings of the text or other person to assert its own truth 
against one's own fore-meanings. This provides an openness 
to the Other, without which there can be no genuine human 
relationship. A violation of this openness is the false 
claim to understanding the Other in advance, and thus 
distancing him. This becomes a means of "mastering the 
pact," and ultimately the other person. The Other is denied 
a voice. The splintering of such dogmatic presuppositions 
comes with "the question."
E) Language and Dialogue as the Realization of Understanding 
In a conversation between persons who are open to what 
the other is saying, questioning becomes a testing, where 
questions are not suppressed by the dominant opinion. The 
give and take, or play, of questioning and answering probes 
the significance of what is being examined not as true, but 
as meaningful. And faithful to the hermeneutic method, "the 
possibility of its truth remains unsettled, this is the real 
and basic nature of a question, namely to make things 
indeterminate."127
Persons who are engaged in conversation are involved in 
the hermeneutic situation where communication of meaning is 
the common goal. It is the purpose of language to perform 
this exchange of meaning. Language is the common milieu of
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persons seeking to understand. "To reach an understanding 
with one's partner in dialogue is not merely a matter of
total self-expression and the successful assertion of one's
own point of view, but a transformation into a communion, in 
which we do not remain what we were.”12®
Language is the root commonality between any persons 
seeking to understand each other. Speaking the same
language is a presupposition for any authentic 
conversation. With this common thread of language, each 
person opens him/herself to the others in order to engage in 
understanding "not a particular individual, but what he 
s a y s . " 1 2 ^ What is to be grasped in the play of language is 
the "objective rightness or otherwise of his opinion.
Language is not "a tool for the purpose of 
understanding but, rather, coincides with the very act of 
understanding and reaching agreement."131 Language gives a 
voice to one's own horizon of understanding. The meaning
and possibility that one brings to the conversation is put 
into play with the other's own horizon. As such common
expression, language is "the universal medium in which
understanding itself is realized."132
That our capacity and desire to understand is so much 
greater than any statement we make is not a critique of
language. The incongruity of possible knowledge and
possible expression in language does not refer to the 
barrenness of language, but to conventions of meaning that
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have been formed in l a n g u a g e . 137 our desire for knowledge 
looks to release itself from "the socially motivated 
tendency towards uniformity with which language forces 
understanding into particular schematic forms which hem us 
i n . "134 Criticisms of the "conventions of linguistic 
expression" are actually concerned with the conventions of 
meaning. This has nothing to do with the connection between 
language and understanding, except that critical thought 
itself confirms this connection, because it must be 
expressed in language. Therefore, the universality of 
language "keeps pace with the universality of reason."135
Hermeneutical consciousness is active in the relation 
between language and reason. If understanding has a 
"necessary relation of equivalence to its possible 
interpretation," and there are no limits on understanding, 
then "the linguistic form which the interpretation of this 
understanding finds must contain within it an infinite 
dimension that transcends all bounds. Language is the 
language of reason itself."136
Reason is not encapsulated in any single language. 
Thru the hermeneutical experience, multiple languages have 
their own unique ability to name objects. Because any 
understanding and interpretation is meaningful, the coming 
to a meaning is the work of reason preserving a tradition 
while appropriating the meaning issuing from the other. The 
activity of reason in effective historical understanding is
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not confined to a single language, but rather, is an 
inherent characteristic of any language and is constituted 
in each language, as is understanding. This gives the 
opportunity for reason to be involved in the meaning 
disclosed by the other. In the tension, or play of 
interpretation, reason springs free of a given language and 
"is itself constituted linguistically."137
By adhering to this core unity of language and thought, 
Gadamer stresses the importance of concept-formation that is 
the constant labor of understanding. Words and concepts are 
not tools for the interpreter's task of understanding. 
Rather, concepts shape understanding through the words in 
which the object realizes itself and that are simultaneously 
the language of the interpreter. Thus there is a dynamism 
to conceptualization that is charged with the movement of 
historical consciousness. Language is not set apart from 
understanding to be used as a storage-bin from which to 
pluck a given sign for an object. Language is a necessary 
medium for meaning to be realized at all. "Everything that 
is intelligible must be accessible to understanding and to 
interpretation . . . (neither) is ever simply an object, but 
comprises everything that can ever be an object."133 Thus 
understanding must be able to recognize the unlimited 
possibilities of meaning from the object, and as such, 
cannot be constrained to an unchanging universal concept 
that binds the object to the intellect.
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F) A Comparison of Idealist Understanding and
Hermeneutic Understanding
The distinction between the understanding that 
constitutes the object in ahistorical concepts and 
understanding saturated with prejudice is important to 
intersubjectivity in two aspects. Recall Husserl's concerns 
with intersubjectivity as one, the search for an objectively 
shared world based on a presuppositionless science, and two, 
the problem of constituting the Other; or other human beings 
as I myself am constituted. First, in terms of an 
objectively shared world, knowledge is what gives coherence 
to this world and establishes its being a world. As we have 
seen, the Cartesian ego-cogito arrives at knowledge through 
the perception of "extended matter." As manipulable matter 
that is given meaning by a subject, the possible meaning of 
the object expires in the vacuum of scientific 
classification and repeated demonstration. Cast in a vat of 
ahistorical scientific knowledge, objects become signs 
maneuvered by reason, a "thinking substance" that seeks 
sovereignity over "extended matter." This is a sovereignity 
that uses objects as means for its own ends. The world as 
such is a cornucopia of utility. Human activity is thus not 
primarily in relation with the world, but a use of the world 
that is justified and legitimated as knowledge that has 
transcendental status. Reason becomes streamlined to 
accommodate the demands of scientific knowledge and
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technique thru which man controls and utilizes matter. The 
one-way street of reason as instrument of science and 
technique thus distinguishes understanding as
anthropocentric comprehension of the world.
Intersubjectivity in-the-world becomes/ then, a 
manifestation of this "instrumental" reason in 
understanding. Instrumental reason operates on the 
fundamental distinction between subject and object. The 
commonality with Others now rests on the commonality of 
knowledge created by science that tends to include other 
human beings in its categorization of objects distinct from 
the subject, and hence objects of instrumental reason. The 
transcendental realm of a presuppositionless science 
legitimates the subject/object dichotomy and logically, 
instrumental reason.
Secondly, the schism between subject and object as 
other than the subject also indicates a schism between human 
subjects as Others. This denies the fundamental "we" of 
human existence. As knowing subjects, each knows only 
his/her world of experience, but none in commonality with 
Others.
Husserl modified his idealist conception of reality 
with his analysis of intentionality. He sought to respect 
the object's own meaning through a method of pure 
description that could also serve to constitute the world 
primarily as "my world, a personal world for me." The only
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problem was that with the world as primarily my world, any 
conception of our world would necessarily be a derivation of 
my world.
Gadamer is willing to give up the primacy of the 
subject and submit the meaning of the world to the play of 
language. In this way we are able to "build up our own 
world in language" in actual relationships with one 
another. This "genuine speaking, which has something to 
say," recognizes the common experience of dialogue and the 
interconnectedness of persons.139
Inherent to dialogue is a reciprocal relationship 
between speakers. It is not an "I and Thou," where each is 
intact as an isolated entity having only its own world. 
"Thou" may indicate our separateness, but there is a common 
understanding; a "deep common accord" is presupposed. This 
situates language not in the realm of "I-Thou" but in the 
realm of "We." To speak of an object is to present it 
before someone else in a language we both understand.14^
Gadamer frees the meaning of the world from the 
possessive grip of the constituting ego and allows what is 
said to have "a claim over one." In this respect, "language 
. . . on it depends the fact that man has a world at all 
. . . this world is linguistic in nature."141 Hence 
Gadamer's observation that "whoever has language 'has' the 
world."142
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Having language, and hence having the world emanates 
not from the application of fixated concepts as in 
scientific rationality, but from language wrestling with our 
own finitude. It is the event of tradition working in 
understanding to expand one's horizon through the dialectic 
of question and possible answer.
This brings us to the relationship of meaning to the 
"I." For hermeneutics, the meaning of traditions, of 
prejudice, of what is handed down, "finds its concretion in 
its relation to the understanding 'I,' - and not in the
reconstruction of an 'I' of the original meaning."143 ^ e  
"I" is a matter of situating the "I" in-the-world because 
outside of this historical, linguistic being, the world does 
not exist.
Despite Husserl's laborious attempt to retrieve the 
world after carving out the original meaning of the "I" as 
eidos, intersubjectivity flounders as a way of 
being-in-the-world. The original "I" does not give itself 
over to the play of meaning. With Husserl, 
intersubjectivity becomes a Frankensteinian creation of 
sorts; a desire for . community distorted into a grotesque 
entity that leaves its creator unfulfilled and alone.
Husserl's empathic grasping of the Other in 
transcendental egology is subverted by Gadamer's concrete 
transparent linguistic understanding. The meaning of
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objective reality becomes shared in the commonality of
language that presupposes the "We" of human being.
Intersubjectivity is now an activity of a linguistic
consciousness that is historical. Gadamer has maintained 
hermeneutics in the event of understanding. Language and
interpretation are not tools for understanding, but rather 
are understanding itself. , And as participants in the 
activity of dialogue Dasein-with, or intersubjectivity 
becomes ontologically linguistic.
The scientific subject with its tote of tools for
language never gives itself over to an authentically shared 
world. It remains a purveyor of meaning that does little 
more than anthropomorphize all it perceives. For 
intersubjectivity, the mode of science and technology that 
pervades consciousness-is reflected as an implicit attitude 
with which we engage in dialogue. Understanding is revealed 
in language; reason itself is constituted linguistically. 
Thus instrumental reason works its way into 
intersubjectivity and is sedimented in words that become 
"ossified" terminology. The grip of the scientific mind on 
reality through instrumental reason and technology is the 
overriding characteristic of our time and demands further 
investigation and clarification that will be the thrust of 
the next section.
PART II. INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND DISTORTION
CHAPTER 3
HABERMAS'S THEORY OF UNDISTORTED COMMUNICATION
The following section will deal with the work of Jurgen 
Habermas. The hub of Habermas's writing is the concern with 
rationality that is permeated with a backlog of structures 
of domination. He wants to develop a theory of knowledge 
and communication that will allow for the emancipation of 
people from repressive traditions and authority.
The term "repressive" that is used by Habermas to 
describe tradition and authority is the bone of contention 
between Habermas and Gadamer. As we have seen, Gadamer's
historical-hermeneutic intersubjectivity appropriates
tradition and authority as not only inescapable prejudice in 
which the subject is submerged, but meaningful prejudice 
that gives the subject an orientation in the world. The 
individual's prejudices, "far more than his judgments, 
constitute the historical reality of his being." Tradition 
incorporates freedom and history in the act of preservation, 
the act of reason, because tradition must be cultivated, 
affirmed, embraced. "Preservation is as much a freely 
chosen action as revolution and renewal." Thus it is the 
preservation of tradition fused with the present that
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provides the fermentation of meaning in the play of inter- 
subjective dialogue and interpretation.
Habermas, in contrast, will contend that tradition is a 
source of distorted meaning. It is a perpetuation of 
repressive authority manifested in institutions and 
ideologies. He will opt for a critical intersubjectivity, 
an intersubjectivity bounded by certain critical ideals for 
securing truth and severing communication from the authority 
of tradition imbedded in institutions, and the norms and 
values of society. Such critical intersubjectivity is the 
arena for undistorted communication between autonomous, 
responsible participants, and the basis for social 
transformation.
A) Critical Theory
This project indicates Habermas's fundamentally Marxist 
orientation towards a theory of society. However, 
Habermas's social theory is greatly modified from that of 
the determinism of orthodox Marxism. Habermas speaks from 
the chorus of critical theory developed by the Frankfurt 
School in Germany in the first half of this century. As 
modified Marxism, critical theory finds the germ of 
emancipation from domination in consciousness, rather than 
in class conflict. A theory of motivation replaces a theory 
of causality. Habermas extends the scope of his writing 
beyond the criticism of instrumental reason and the 
administrative techno-scientific power structure that was
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the meat of repression for Max Horkeimer, Theodor Adorno, 
Herbert Marcuse, and other colleagues at the Frankfurt 
School. He thus develops a theory of communication founded 
on motivation.
The failure of revolution by the proletariat in 
America, the degeneration of Stalinism into technocratic 
bureaucracy, the absence of the revolutionary class 
consciousness, and the condensation of Marxist theory into a 
deterministic and pessimistic critique of culture are the 
main points of the paralysis of revolution.1
For Habermas, there have been changes in the structure 
of capitalism in terms of state intervention in the private 
market and organizational techniques. Organization and 
bureaucracy are results of instrumental reason, or 
"objectifiable and technically instrumental knowledge which 
controls experience by making it schematically accessible 
and r e p e a t a b l e ."2 Reason thus concerns itself with method, 
not end. The efficient coordination of the social system 
jeopardizes the public sphere of political life, i.e., 
democratic institutions where rational discourse may take 
place. Habermas thus sees a need to rethink social 
theories, including Marxism, which are no longer valid, or 
whose goals have been obscured in techno-scientistic 
societies. He seeks to reconstruct these goals by removing 
the distortions accrued by instrumental reason, 
techno-science, capitalism, and other repressive ideologies.
66
Individual questioning of administrative activities in 
government dissipates in a labyrinth of faceless authority. 
Class conflict is abated by regulative techniques of 
management. It is a rehabilitated reason, a critical reason 
that is the thread between theory and practice unravelled 
in language which Habermas will use to rescue human freedom 
and autonomy from authority. Thus reason is essential for 
emancipation in the reflective realm of critical theory.
Critical theory for Habermas is a "philosophy of
history with political intentions."3 its task is to develop 
a theory of historical understanding distinct from 
historical explanation as a science, and to articulate the 
role of interpretive understanding in social practice. In 
this way, critical theory embraces hermeneutics, as far as 
hermeneutics offers a mode of historical understanding and 
describes social practice in the form of practical speech or 
communicative understanding. These dimensions of
hermeneutics are appropriated by Habermas.
However, Habermas utilizes critical theory as a method 
with which to critique society and history. This is an 
approach toward "emancipation from our historical past,"
where history is viewed as "a history of the exercise of 
domination and repression. Here critical theory joins
forces with science against hermeneutics."4 Science is that 
which provides us "new means of control over our natural 
c o n d i t i o n . A s  method, critical theory takes the stance of
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an objective observatory overlooking experience. 
Emancipation which wields critical theory against authority 
and tradition has the implication of a "shared form of life 
in which we have come to an understanding with one another 
which need no longer be revoked."6 For Habermas, it is the 
ideal speech situation in communicative action which 
provides this form of life. And it is in opposition to this 
point of objectivity that hermeneutics will stand in our 
concluding section. Now let us whittle into the dense body 
of Habermas's thought which eventually leads us to a theory 
of society free from distortive structures of authority.
Habermas, in working from the perspective of critical 
theory, is resistant to the demands of traditional theory, 
or rather, the legacy of the Enlightenment and idealist 
philosophy. We have had a taste of this idealism in our 
above references to Descartes and Husserl. The demands of 
traditional theory are more fully articulated by Max 
Horkheimer in his outline of its logical structure.? First, 
there is the subsumption of facts and events under lawlike 
or nomological statements. Second, traditional theory is 
ahistorical, i.e., it abstracts from the historicality of 
the object and knowing subject. And thirdly, there is the 
fundamental division between subject and object. This 
structure of traditional philosophical thought is due to the 
Cartesian dualism of thought and being as a natural 
mechanism; a process that is static and discoverable through
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reason in the form of laws which in turn establish an 
objectively shared world. Thus, we have intersubjective 
meaning defined in terms of transcendental, objective laws.
Critical theory, on the far edge of this search for 
knowledge, interpolates the role of human activity in the 
shaping of a shared world. The contribution of German 
idealism to the significance of human action, specifically 
Kant, is the reconsideration of the knowing subject in its 
essential relation to time. Critical theory, as a critique 
of history, thus maintains itself as simultaneously 
empirical and practical. It is both a critical theory of 
society as it is and a theory dominated at every turn by a 
concern for reasonable conditions of life.®
This historical dimension of critical theory retains 
the status of reasonable objectivity because it is a 
relation of the subject to time, and not Heidegger's concept 
of being as time. Hence, there is a dichotomy between 
reason and history inherent to critical theory. This is a 
perpetuation of the split between subject and object in 
Cartesian subjectivity. It is a problematic that Habermas 
wants to overcome through his quasi-transcendental structure 
of language, but also, it is the force of his argument 
against authority, which can be substituted for history in 
opposition to reason.
Horkheimer outlines the dual character of contemporary 
society. First, the economy and culture are products of
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human work and organization, as creations of self-conscious 
will. Secondly, bourgeois society is comparable to 
non-human natural processes, to pure mechanism.9 The place 
between these two aspects of reflection and natural science 
is significant for Habermas. This is where he positions 
critical theory as a practical theory of truth that lies
between reflective philosophy and empirical science; it is
an "empirical philosophy with practical intent."
In order to substantiate the "betweenness" of critical 
philosophy, i.e., between theory or knowledge and practical 
intentions, or human interests, Habermas models the
structures of human experience according to 
quasi-transcendental principles. Through his use of Kant, 
Habermas modifies Kant's a priori structures of knowledge 
(i.e., pure intuition, understanding) as historical and
social a priori principles. The link between theoretical
reason and practical reason as one that is fundamentally 
historical brings the "quasi-" into Habermas's theory. 
Habermas wants to establish the relation between knowledge 
and its object. For Kant, "the distinction between the
transcendental and the empirical belongs only to the
critique of knowledge; it does not concern the relation of
that knowledge to its objects."10 But this relation is 
essential for Habermas because he is trading a theory of
causation (class conflict and the technological overcoming 
of the fetters of the means of production) for a theory of
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motivation which locates emancipation in consciousness. He 
must link interests derived from material being with ideas 
without using the base-superstructure deterministic model of 
Marx, because the base is no longer reliable as a source of 
social transformation. Ideas, consciousness, in turn, must 
connect with a social context in order for the light of 
reason in reflection to have any impact in society. Thus, 
Habermas needs to show that the transcendental which belongs 
to the critique of knowledge rests upon unacknowledged 
presuppositions that are historically generated. As such, 
there can be a critique of knowledge that is transcendent of 
a society and yet recognized as within the historical 
context of that society.
From this modified transcendental perspective Habermas 
creates a space for critical reflection that can apply to a 
particular historical situation. Critical philosophy cannot 
have a concept of knowledge which is elucidated 
"independently of the subjective conditions of the 
objectivity of possible k n o w l e d g e . O b j e c t i v i t y  is 
derived from subjective circumstances which constitute the 
"highest employment of understanding" shown by the Kantian 
principle of the synthetic unity of apperception (ego).12
This subjective and explicitly historical temper of 
knowledge as Habermas describes it is contradictory to the 
onslaught of scientism. The rigidity of scientism, or 
science that identifies itself with objective knowledge is
71
strengthened by philosophical positivism, or philosophy of
science. Positivism employs both rationalist and empiricist
traditions to enforce the hold of science on knowledge.
Positive knowledge is knowledge valid after the fact, after
it has been demonstrated. This is not reflected knowledge
which entertains possible meanings, but knowledge which
relies upon the structure of the sciences, or absolute
methodology for its validity.13
B) Habermas's Concept of Self-Reflection 
in Historical Consciousness
Habermas will seek to wrench the possibility of 
self-reflection from the clench of positivist thought, 
which identifies knowledge as what is, and not what could or 
ought to be. Self-reflection nurtures the emancipatory 
interest of humanity, the freedom from repression and the 
freedom for expression. This comes to fruition in 
communicative action, or dialogue that is bounded by 
quasi-transcendental standards, i.e., the truth of the 
propositional content, the comprehensibility of the symbolic 
expression, the truthfulness of the intentional expression, 
and the rightness of the speech act with respect to existing 
norms and values. 14 This ideal speech situation is the 
leavening agent for freedom and autonomy, as well as social 
existence.
The emphasis, on language and dialogue funnels what 
Habermas calls "knowledge-constituitive interests" into
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experience. We can begin to see his theory for linking 
transcendental knowledge with material interests beginning 
to take shape. Knowledge-constitutive interests posit the 
possibility for emancipation in consciousness, limit the 
rule of positive-instrumental knowledge to one area of 
thought (preventing the eclipse of human freedom by 
techno-scientism), and ground reason in history through 
language.
Habermas categorizes knowledge-constitutive interests 
into three main bodies of thought. First, positive, or 
scientific-technological knowledge corresponds to the 
technical interest of man to control the environment. Its 
interest is in labor or work, the instrumental activity in 
the material world. Another division of knowledge is the 
historical-hermeneutic sciences which pertains to language 
interpretations that provide orientations of action within 
common traditions. This symbolic activity involves the 
interest in language. The last division of knowledge is 
that of the social sciences which constitutes the 
legitimations that a society accepts or criticizes. This 
latter division is concerned with the individual in relation 
to the norms of the group. This is the interest in 
p o w e r . Thus, Habermas schematizes knowledge-constitutive 
interests into work, language and power which secure the 
existence of the human species.
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It is only through the power of self-reflection that
knowledge and interest combine. The human interest in 
autonomy and responsibility "can be apprehended a 
p r i o r i . W h a t  differentiates us from nature is language, 
for it is "the only thing whose nature we can k n o w . " 17
Through language, autonomy and responsibility are realized 
for us. Speech expresses "unequivocally the intention of
universal and unconstrained consensus." The a priori truths 
of autonomy and responsibility arrive at historical 
significance in intended speech. Moreover, as a priori, 
autonomy and responsibility parallel the idealist conception 
of reason as both will and consciousness. "Reason also 
means the will to r e a s o n . jt is through self-reflection 
that "knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence 
with the interest in autonomy and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ."19
We can see a curious combination of Husserl, Kant, and
Hegel in this synthesis between knowledge and interest. Let
us first take up with Husserl's approach to knowledge in his
theory of genetic constitution. As a fundamental structure 
of intentionality, rationality was the basis for knowledge 
and human action in the world. The eidetic realm was
primarily a transcendent realm which allowed rational acts 
to be differentiated from instinctual acts. It was human
activity in the temporal world which necessitated the link 
between the eidetic realm and the concrete realm. Here the
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pure, eidetic ego subsided in significance next to the 
concrete ego which generated convictions in history; it was 
an habituated ego.
This juncture between the theoretical eidetic and the 
practical genetic spheres was described as essentially 
rational because it allowed the subject to distinguish a 
reality apart from itself, and to respond to this reality 
thru reason. The theoretical objectivating act is not 
influenced by subjective emotions, culture or history. The
intentional, theoretical act itself is the apperception, 
interpretation, or apprehension of the sensation belonging 
to the act which presents an object to consciousness. But
recall that with Husserl, the object remained a diversity of 
intentionalities, which kept it from being schematized into
a closed concept. Meaning is open to possibility in 
Husserl's phenomenology. Here there is a break with Husserl 
and a move to Kant.
Habermas appropriates Kant's conception of 
understanding as the highest principle of the synthetic 
unity of apperception. Through the mediation of
understanding, sense data were synthesized by the 
transcendental ego and given meaning in concepts. The 
structure of understanding is given a priori, and as such is 
ahistorical, a fixed corpus of thematized meaning and 
knowledge.
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Now we can take the transcendent act of rationality in 
idealism, here illustrated by Husserl, and the 
thematization, or objectification of meaning in closed 
concepts of Kant to establish a rational knowing subject. 
Idealism provides a transcendental understanding of self or 
ego apart from the world through the act of reflection. But 
we need to connect this subject to the world as an active 
subject. For this we turn to Husserl once more.
Husserl modifies the idealist theory of consciousness 
as transcendental understanding when he inscribes genetic 
constitution into egological experience. Recall that 
Husserl's naturalistic attitude regarded things of the world 
as stimulus upon a being as a causal relationship (hence, 
the naturalistic attitude is pre-theoretical,
pre-reflective). But in the personalistic attitude, where a 
person is actively involved in the world by apperceiving, 
remembering, believing, etc., this world, the person 
develops a theoretical or practical or evaluating attitude 
toward this personal environment which exists for him/her. 
In the personalistic attitude, the causal relation gives way 
to a system of motivations. "Things as apprehended by the 
personal I are the starting points of strong tendencies 
attracting the subject to turn to them in practical, 
cognitive, evaluating, etc., acts." The I finds itself
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motivated by these tendencies in its actions or its passive 
endurance of them.20
The intentional relationship of the subject or ego 
towards the world, as active concrete I, is now subject to 
the laws of motivation, which Husserl divides into two 
areas. First, there are the motivations of reason, i.e. 
motivations of acts by acts, in the order of logic. 
Secondly, there are the motivations by association and 
habit. The latter is a genesis of earlier and later 
experiences which may be sedimentations or unreasonable acts 
imposed upon us. These may be distinct or hidden, even 
"unconscious." Under Husserl's theory of genetic
constitution, consciousness is a unity of motivations. The 
subject is active in the world. The ego does not merely 
passively apperceive meaning, but generates meaning through 
convictions derived from temporal experience. Understanding 
becomes a succession of convictions formulated and replaced 
by new experiences of the concrete ego. To this motivated 
ego we add the dialectic of Hegel.
Hegel describes the self-formative process of 
understanding as the formation of standards which are 
disintegrated in the dialectical process and replaced by new 
ones. For Hegel, society was not a composite of 
individuals, but rather the medium within which self-hood 
was shaped through the communication of one with another.
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Through this dialectical process there is an identity which 
is sustained through reflection; this is knowledge as 
reconstructed negation.
In order to keep his materialist, historical context of 
human beings in society, Habermas devises a cognitive 
structure to accommodate the objective demands of critical 
theory. He grasps the rational, transcendental contribution 
of idealism, and the active generating of convictions or 
standards of phenomenology to mold a consciousness capable 
of objective self-reflection upon meaning originating from 
concrete social existence. Autonomy and responsibility are 
aligned with social existence through language. The 
transcendental structures of idealism become
quasi-transcendental structures of language operant in the 
world.
(C) Hegel's Critique of Kant
Habermas must diffuse his quasi-transcendental 
framework with history to prevent it from becoming the 
scaffold of one more mode of domination, one more rhetoric 
of dogmatism. He detours the path to positivism, or pure 
methodology by rehabilitating self-reflection from the 
perspective of Hegel; i.e., Hegel's critique of Kant.
Hegel depicts Kantian epistemology as based upon three 
unacknowledged premises. First, Kant assumes a normative 
concept of science. By "presupposing that the statements of 
mathematics and contemporary physics (Newtonian) are valid
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as reliable knowledge," these principles can be used to draw 
conclusions about the "organization of our cognitive 
faculty."21 Hegel's counter to this claim is that "one 
barren assurance is just as valid as another . . . the
critique of knowledge must begin by abstaining from any 
prejudgment about what is to count as science."22 If varied 
manifestations of knowledge, or everyday life experiences in 
the world become our focus, then the standards that arise 
out of this process can be revealed as coming from the 
self-formative process of consciousness. Through
reconstructing this process of self-formation all stages of 
the formation of standards can be shown as a disintegration 
of preceding premises and the making of new ones.
This brings us to the second presupposition of Kant, 
the assumption of a complete, fixed knowing subject. Hegel 
rebuts this claim with the concept of the genesis of the 
phenomenological experience. Perspectives are thus produced 
in a continually renewed process of reflection.
The last presupposition of Kant is that of the 
distinction between theoretical reason, the ego as the unity 
of self-consciousness and practical reason, the ego as free 
will. Hegel asserts the reversal of consciousness against 
this claim. We learn from negative experiences: the
"dissolutions of identifications, the breaking of 
fixations, the destruction of projections."23 Determinate 
negation of a state of consciousness is not an empty
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nothingness but is the nothingness from which it resulted, a 
result containing that which was true in the previous 
instance of knowledge. Hence, "a form of life that has 
become an abstraction cannot be negated without leaving a 
trace, or overthrown without practical consequences."24
D) Hegel's Concept of Dialectical Self-Formation
The successive relation between states of consciousness 
of a system brought about through determinate negation is 
not a logical or a causal relation, but a self-formative 
process. Knowledge is a genesis of levels of reflections 
which sustain an identity of mind through the negated 
identifications of consciousness. As dialectical, identity 
has within itself the distinction between theoretical and 
practical reason and cannot be defined in relation to this 
distinction in reason.
By drawing upon the conception of knowledge as 
self-formative, as a generating process of reconstructing 
identifications, Habermas can situate the emancipatory 
interest in the process of self-reflection. Self-reflection 
serves to break fixations, shatter distortions while 
simultaneously preserving an identifiable meaning.
This self-formative process is not the activity of an 
isolated ego, but rather a social process. Hegel "does not 
conceive society as a product of contact between already 
existent individuals, but more fundamentally as a medium 
within which self-hood is shaped and therefore as the
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condition of possibility of the individuals who constitute 
it."25 Hegel's "Geist," or Spirit, is the medium within 
which an "I" communicates with another "I," and from which, 
as an absolute mediation, the two form each other into 
subjects.
"Geist" has three patterns of mediation; moral 
relationships, language, and labor. The mediation of the 
moral relationship is a dialectical process of alienation 
and reconciliation. Through this process, power and false 
objectification enable the institution of an objective 
world. Thus structures of domination are realizable as 
institutions. This first mode of mediation is an 
intersubjective relation between individuals-in-difference. 
Next, labor and language each involve the dialectic of 
externalization and appropriation which results in an 
objectivating mediation. What is external and appropriated 
by labor is the material world, and for language it is the 
symbolic world.
Habermas identifies the activity of "Geist" in the 
objective act of labor as technical control, of language as 
communication, and of moral interaction as emancipation.26 
The development of the human species is centered on one of 
these three acts for Hegel, Marx and Habermas. Hegel 
collapses language and labor into moral interaction, Marx 
collapses language and moral interaction into labor, and
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Habermas argues that development of society occurs in the 
medium of symbolically mediated interaction, or linguistic 
communication.
Recall that Habermas has set before us a critical 
philosophy which was described as an empirical philosophy of 
history with practical intent. He wants a theory of 
knowledge, of truth that is at once empirical, i.e., refers
to the natural world of human existence, and reflective,
i.e., allows the subject to transcend immediate reality and 
distinguish oneself from it. The "objectivating" medium of 
labor and language provides the technical and practical 
aspects of the empirical world, while the critical medium of 
reflection on power provides the emancipatory aspect of
transcendental philosophy.
Emancipation for Habermas is freedom from the 
hypostasized constraints of distorted communication. It is 
Hegel's dialectic of power and alienation which provides the 
possibility of critical insight into the false objectivity, 
or legitimacy of institutional and internal subjective 
forces. The role of self-reflection is to disclose and 
negate unconsciously motivated compulsive behavior and the
limits of perceptions which tend to work as pseudo a priori 
assumptions, or ideology.
Hegel's rational reconstruction in the self-formative 
process of determinate negations is applied to social 
evolution and the structure of distorted, or objectively
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false communication. "It has its basis in the logic of 
undistorted language communication," in the truths that are 
retained in the succession of negations and formations.
This method of dialectically connecting theory and
practice, knowledge and interest divides the emancipatory 
interest of critical reflection into one, rational 
reconstruction and two, critical s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . 2 6
Critical self-reflection differs from rational 
reconstruction in one, that it reveals false objectivity; 
paranoia, phobias, not the "objective data" that are 
conscious creations of the subject from the beginning. Two, 
it is criticism of something particular; a parental figure, 
and not an anonymous system of rules; a corporate rank and 
file system. Three, critical self-reflection reveals 
unconscious elements to consciousness in a manner that has 
practical implications, i.e., one can alter habits of action
once one has become conscious of the habit; one has a
rational choice of action.
Reconstruction shows know-how, the intuitive knowledge 
we acquire when we possess rule-competence without involving 
practical consequences.28 This aspect of reconstruction 
zeroes directly in on the critique of ideology to which 
Habermas targets his entire social theory. It is the 
criticism of concepts of legitimated systems of thought, of 
individualism, utilitarianism, consumerism, of scientism. 
We can know the distortions of ideology and reconstruct
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their meaning through a process of rational negation and 
elimination of distorting forces to reveal the truths within 
these concepts.
E) Habermas's Relocation of Emancipation: From Causal 
Relations to Motivated Consciousness
By combining self-reflection; which frees the subject 
from particular unconscious distortions/ with rational 
reconstruction; which frees universalizable concepts from 
distortion and reconstructs their meaning, Habermas can weld 
the empirical and theoretical in consciousness through the 
emancipatory interest. Emancipation need no longer be 
dependent upon "social processes, the material production 
and appropriation of products."29 Emancipation can be an 
act of motivated rational consciousness. The paralysis of 
the proletariat can be invigorated by critical reflection on 
symbolic structures in language and institutions.
Habermas makes the distinction between Marx's material 
conception of synthesis and that of symbolic synthesis in 
reflection and language in order to identify the 
technological trap awaiting Marx. General social knowledge 
that is a force of production implies that the "knowledge 
that makes possible the control of natural processes turns 
into knowledge that makes possible the control of the social 
life p r o c e s s . "30 Productive knowledge determines reflective 
knowledge. Knowledge directing social processes is 
analogous to natural science as the power of technical
84
control, and fosters the actualization of technology as an 
autonomous entity permeating social reality.31 Habermas 
tunnels out of this "nature-like" process of social activity 
through linguistic interaction, and arrives at rational 
activity.
Marx constituted knowledge at the level of production. 
This entailed social practice that included work and 
interaction, labor and language. "The processes of natural 
history are mediated by the productive activity of
individuals and the organization of their interrela­
tions. "32 These relations are regulated by norms and 
legitimated by institutions, which determine the allocation 
of rewards, duties, obligations and responsibilities among 
social members. Institutions distribute the social surplus 
created by labor. The medium in which these social 
relations are normatively regulated is cultural tradition, 
which in turn creates a class structure. Tradition also 
"forms the linguistic communication structure on the basis 
of which subjects interpret both nature and themselves in 
their environment."33
Habermas uses this framework of institutions and
communicative action to work out his theory of interests. 
Prom the Marxist viewpoint, material activity, or labor, 
directs the way in which natural history moves. The 
processes of natural history are mediated by individual 
productive activity and how their interrelations are
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organized. Human existence depends upon instrumental action 
(labor) to constrain external nature through the technical 
control over nature in the forces of production. 
"Communicative action (language) stands in correspondence to 
t h e  suppression of man's own n a t u r e . " 3 4  it is the 
institutional matrix which commands the extent of repression 
by "the unreflected 'natural' force of social dependence and 
political power, which is rooted in prior history and 
tradition."35
A society's emancipation from the external forces of 
nature (i.e., having a consistent food supply, secure 
dwellings, geographical mobility) is determined by the labor 
processes, or the production of technological knowledge. 
"Emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature" 
(individual desires, emotional needs, wants) is secured when 
institutions based on force are replaced by democratic 
institutions whereby the "organization of social relations 
. . . is bound only to communication free from d o m i n a t i o n . "36
Habermas, like Marx, sees internal human nature 
squelched by the institutions rising from the past. The 
realization and fulfillment of changing human needs and 
wants is relegated to traditional norms that become 
sedimented and unresponsive to the dialectical 
self-formative process. Marx brandishes the emancipatory 
sword at the beast of domination not only in productive
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activity, or class conflict, but also in the critical
activity of the relations of production, or realm of class 
consciousness.
Marx equates the consciousness of a society to the 
level of technically available knowledge. For Marx, the
foremost activity of human being is labor, or productive 
activity that realizes human needs and wants through the 
engagement in nature for other human beings. Thus for Marx, 
the self-formative process is the labor process, the
Hegelian dialectic materialized.
Habermas objects to this collapse of moral activity and 
also language into labor (labor determines both) because "as 
far as the identity of a society takes form via the level of 
scientific-technical progress, it is the self-consciousness 
of 'the' social subject," the mass identity with
instrumental consciousness.
"The" social subject is not an augmentation of the 
subject generated in the scientific-technical sphere of 
knowledge. For Habermas, the "self-generative act" of Marx 
involved in the material working-up of nature is distinct 
from but accompanied by "a self-formative process mediated 
by the interaction of class subjects either under compulsory 
integration or open rivalry."37 That is, compulsory 
integration by institutions carry the weight of binding 
tradition. This is Habermas's distinction between a 
material conception of synthesis of meaning and a symbolic
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synthesis of meaning in language and institutions. The 
self-generation of the subject and the self-formation of the 
social subject are interdependent, but do not converge.38
In Marxist theory, self-formation is coincidental with 
productive activity, critical reflection coincides with 
production, and is dependent upon technology for 
emancipation from ideological constraints on social 
relations. Humanity free from external natural constraints 
is humanity free from institutional constraints on internal 
nature. In this framing of reality, repression is doomed to 
repeat itself through the overcoming of fetters to 
production in class revolution. Class consciousness 
implements a new stage of technical knowledge which requires 
a redistribution of social surplus and the use, then, again, 
of repressive institutions working between classes in 
society.
"As long as the constraint of external nature 
persists in the form of economic scarcity, every 
revolutionary class is induced, after its victory, 
to a new 'injustice,' namely the establishment of 
a new class rule. Therefore the dialectic of the 
moral life must repeat itself until the 
materialist spell that is cast upon the 
reproduction of social life, the Biblical curse of 
necessary labor, is broken technologically."39
This determinism of repression impedes the movement of
emancipation, and is replaced by a dialectic of the moral
life not in labor, but in dialogue. Habermas makes a move
from Marx to Hegel for the dialectic of self-formation in
intersubjectivity as individual identities-in-difference.
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We move from historical production to historical 
consciousness; from causality to motivation.
Repression becomes a matter of suppression and renewal 
in the dialogue situation that is "reconstructed as moral 
relation."40 Thru this reconstructive activity of dialogue, 
or "struggle for recognition," the "grammatical relations of 
communication" that were "once distorted by force, exert 
force themselves."41 The movement of the dialectic rids 
communication of the distorting force of false 
objectification and generates freedom from constraint in 
discourse. It is not "unconstrained intersubjectivity 
itself that we call dialectic, but the history of its 
repression and re-establishment."42 Dialogic distortion, or 
ideology, takes the form of "split-off symbols and reified 
grammatical relations . . . removed from public
communication (and) prevail only behind the backs of 
subjects, and are thus also empirically coercive."43 For 
example, national security is addressed in the language of 
escalating militarism and a defense from communism, but not 
in terms of global American corporate hegemony.
F) Meta-Psychology as the Link Between Theory and Practice
The next step is to show how knowledge can "reconstruct 
underlying experiences of the history of the species" which 
in turn lead to "a new stage of self-reflection in the 
self-formative process of the s p e c i e s . "44 Reconstruction is
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the setting right of a "mutilated text of tradition"^ 
through the elimination of errors contained within the 
text. The meaning of the text may be mutilated by external 
conditions.. It can be mutilated by limitations placed on 
conduits of transmission, be they memory or cultural 
tradition. Unintentional distortions or mutilations can 
only be comprehended after the meaning of the distortion 
itself has been analyzed. Psychoanalysis probes meaning 
structures in terms of the unintentional. But 
psychoanalysis does not aim at understanding symbolic 
structures (cultural objectifications), but at
self-reflection.
Thus Habermas transposes Hegel's dialectic of 
transformation from Marx's material alteration to the 
process of psychoanalysis which occurs in concrete reality 
in the relation of patient to physician. He is in keeping 
with his goal of a philosophical theory with practical 
intent.
In psychoanalysis, the existence of distortions in both 
the subject's memory and institutions blocks the possibility 
of meaning being realized or comprehended. The 
reconstructive method of identifying distortions in the self 
can be applied to the larger context of culture because 
self-reflection is a core characteristic of the individual's 
participation in society where values for the human species
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as a whole are generated. By starting from square one, the 
self-formative process of the individual, Habermas proceeds 
to build a case for the eventual application of distortion 
identification to cultural traditions, or ideology,
particularly the instrumental rationality of
technoscientism. He can only proceed in one manner, and 
that is through language, for it is within language that the 
Hegelian dialectic of identity-in-difference, or interaction 
of individuals becomes a concrete social phenomenon, or 
intersubjectivity-in-the-world. Thus, consciousness as 
individual self-formation (consciousness as a unity of 
motivations) is species consciousness formation. And it is 
in language that theoretical reason and practical reason are 
one; reason is a will to reason, critique as the passion for 
c r i t i q u e . 46 Reason as such is active in the
quasi-transcendental structure of the language situation 
which nurtures the emancipatory interest of humanity.
The methodological move from self-reflection to 
species-reflection is made through metapsychology which 
arrives at a "meta"- intersubjectivity, or critical 
intersubjectivity.
Metapsychology incorporates "conceptual constructions, 
the assumptions about the functional structures of the 
psychic apparatus (id,ego,superego) and about mechanisms of 
both the genesis of symptoms and the dissolution of
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pathological compulsions."47 This is the Freudian scheme of 
the ego's resistance to a perception and subsequent
repression, or refusal to deal with something, which becomes 
a psychological distortion in the unconscious which can then 
only be identified thru the process of self-reflection, or 
the process of making conscious that which is obscure or 
unconscious, thus bringing about a reintegration of the ego 
in consciousness thru reconstructing and identifying 
meaning. This structural model replete with definitions 
becomes a "rigorous scientific formulation," and therefore a 
basis for knowledge.
Metapsychology is "a general interpretation of
self-formative p r o c e s s e s . " 4 ** a s  such a "metahermeneutics,"
metapsychology "unfolds the logic of interpretation in the 
analytic situation of dialogue."4** The use of reason, or 
logic, establishes the foundation for possible 
psychoanalytic knowledge. Metapsychology
"is on the same level as the methodology of 
the natural and cultural sciences. It, too 
reflects on the transcendental framework of 
analytic knowledge as an objective structure of 
organized processes of inquiry, which here include 
processes of self knowledge. However, in contrast 
to the logic of the natural and cultural sciences, 
methodology cannot exist detached from material 
content at the level of self-reflection. For here 
the structure of the cognitive situation is 
identical with the object of knowledge."50
This material content keeps metapsychology from taking
the status of metatheoretical propositions and lapsing
into a pure methodology of idealism or positivism.
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The practical intent of metapsychology deals with the 
link between language and interaction? particularly 
"language deformation" and "behavioral psychology." With 
this in mind, ordinary language is confronted with two 
tasks. First, ordinary language accounts for the validity 
of symbols determined intersubjectively through dialogue. 
Second, socialization becomes comprehensible through 
language, or rather, the grammar of language games. In this 
way the structure of language defines both language and 
conduct. "Motives of action are also comprehended as 
linguistically interpreted needs."51 Motivations are 
illuminated in language. They are not impulses functioning 
behind subjectivity, but rather are "subjectively guiding, 
symbolically mediated, and reciprocally interrelated 
intensions."52 As with Husserl, consciousness is thus a 
unity of motivations.
This reference to impulses working behind subjectivity 
is Habermas's definition of authority. He is setting up a 
refutation of authority that runs counter to Gadamer's 
retrieval of authority and tradition, both perceived by 
Habermas as repressive structures.
Through metapsychology, motivations can be uncovered, 
displayed and dissected in order to ascertain truth. The 
"split-off symbols" and unconscious motives that' distort 
everyday language games in habitual interactions, i.e., 
"compulsion, lies, and the inability to correspond
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expectations that have been made socially obligatory" turn 
into a kind of "impulse potential." As instinct that is 
collective, self-preservation or suppressed drives is rooted 
in "meaning structures of the life world."53 These 
distorted motives operate as a mode of "natural" conditions 
subject to the causality of fate, not nature, "because it 
prevails through the symbolic means of the mind. Only for 
this reason can it be compelled by the power of 
reflection."54 Only because conscious motives have been 
distorted in symbolic communicative action (or linguistic 
spheres) as authority in traditions and institutions can 
they be attacked by self-reflection. Distorted meaning in 
the mind cannot be cured by material labor or technology 
(without giving over to instrumental reason). Only at the 
level of cognitive self-reflection can distorted or 
unconscious motives become conscious. This mutilated text 
of the individual can be reconstructed in the framework of 
metapsychology.
However, when we move to a mutilated public text, the 
framework of a reconstructive meta-sociology is not readily 
available, but is necessary to shatter authority. The task 
is not the reconstruction of an individual life history, but 
a collective history. An individual participating 
intersubjectively can give meaning to a symbol "through 
rules resulting from contingent circumstances of the 
individual's life history."55 gut this is not to say that
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the individual perceives the symbol "according to 
intersubjectively recognized rules."56 Thus the rules which 
guide an individual to the meaning of a symbol may differ 
from another individual with a different life history.
Concealed meaning and distorted public interaction cannot be 
ascertained by the individual or others.
Habermas uses internal intersubjectivity, the dialogue 
of a person with him/herself, to demonstrate his point. 
Distorted meanings "can only become understandable at the 
level of an intersubjectivity that must be created between 
the subject as ego and the subject as id,"57 i.e., through 
self-reflection. The identification of false meanings, or 
split-off symbols resulting from this internal dialogue is 
the reconstructive work of self-reflection. This analysis 
of the unconscious ferrets out the connection between 
critique as knowledge and critique as transformation. 
Self-reflection explains the origin and eliminates the 
causality of fate, of the "natural" perpetuation of
repressed intentions. Thus, "depth-hermeneutic
understanding takes over the function of explanation."55
Its explanatory power comes from self-reflection "in which 
an objectivation that is both understood and explained is 
also overcome." This is the Hegelian critical 
accomplishment of comprehending.
Self-reflection is emancipatory. The goal now is to 
take the blueprint of individual self-reflection and derive
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a structure for social emancipation. The architecture of
this ambition of Habermas is the ideal speech situation.
The key to this conversion of individual emancipation to
social emancipation is dialogue. The internal 
intersubjective dialogue of reconstruction through 
self-reflection pivots to an external intersubjective
dialogue of reconstruction through self-reflection. But the 
methodology or the rules for reconstruction must have an 
external intersubjective validity. The rules must apply to 
society as a whole, not an individual with a particular life 
history, in order to ensure that the reconstructed meaning 
is comprehensible by social participants. As the method 
which identifies distortion, and provides for the rational 
self-reflective emancipation of society, we have arrived at 
the ideal speech situation as a critical intersubjectivity. 
The guidelines of metapsychology have been replaced by
quasi-transcendental standards, or rules of reconstructing 
socially situated meaning, i.e., truth, truthfulness, 
rightness, ad comprehensibility.
Critique becomes practical due to the inherent
connection between the empirical structure (norms, 
traditions, institutions) which it pierces and the
intentional structure that it reconstructs and makes
understood by way of grammatical r u l e s . 59 The generative 
connection between language and norms and values allows the 
same kind of dialogue we saw in psychoanalysis to occur at
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the level of communication and institutions in society. 
Individual distorted meanings are now analogous to 
ideological distortion. As one giant patient, society is 
held hostage by distortions on the scale of Lilliputian 
tethers, needing only to carry out a reflective dialogue 
within itself to shirk its restraints and realize its
freedom. The means to perform this feat is "an organization
of social relations according to the principle that the 
validity of social relations according to the principle that 
the validity of every norm of political consequence be made 
dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free 
from domination."60 This organization is the ideal speech 
situation.
Self-reflection as an interest in knowledge becomes an 
emancipation from the previously distorted objectification 
which was not identified by the subject. Self-reflection as 
dialogue posits the individual as acting in a concrete 
reality. These materialist presuppositions, of language and 
labor as creating objectifications in the material world 
(Hegel), change the relation of reason and interest. The 
proposition that "interest inheres in reason" found in
idealism is altered to the claim of reason inhering in 
interest, found in the self-constitutive human species in
contingent natural conditions.61
Habermas has filled out his shift from the causal mode 
of emancipation to the motivated mode of emancipation with
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an inherently rational structure tied to the world through 
interest, specifically the linguistic interest which garners 
emancipation through self-reflective dialogue. The
dialectical dissolution of previously held convictions 
through negative reconstruction benefits and combines 
knowledge and interest, theory and practice. The dialectic 
uncovers and retains a consistent truth in a concept which 
establishes identifiable knowledge. And with this
knowledge, it frees consciousness from distortion or 
incompatibilities, and renders the subject liberated from 
repressive structures and hence capable of autonomous and 
responsible action.
G) Summary of Habermasfs Critical Theory
This brings us full circle to the original intent of 
Habermas to locate emancipation in consciousness, in 
cognitive structures, and not the traditional Marxist 
structures of class conflict and technology. The 
quasi-transcendental arena for undistorted communication is 
the "shared form of life in which we have come to an 
understanding with one another which need no longer be 
revoked." The ideals of truth, truthfulness, rightness, and 
comprehensibility guard against the deceptions and 
repressions brought to language by authority and tradition, 
the ogres of history. Rational reconstruction
(self-reflection) dispels ideology from institutions and
98
welcomes rehabilitated democratic institutions in which the 
original meanings of concepts can flourish.
The anticipation of "the realization of the good 
life"62 in and through the ideal speech situation is itself 
tied to tradition, the topic of Habermas's scathing 
scrutiny. As a shared form of life, ideal speech assumes 
shared meanings and shared beliefs. These beliefs find 
their source in the "Enlightenment ideals of rationality 
(truth as unconstrained consensus), justice (the effective 
equality of chances to assume dialogue roles), and freedom 
(responsible, authentic autonomy). (T)he historical origins 
and ideal character of those beliefs" contextualizes them 
and "undercuts Habermas's argument for their transcendental 
necessity."63 Could this criticism be seen not only as an 
oversight by Habermas but as a favorable attitude toward 
tradition as containing elements of freedom? Or any other 
prejudice from which we see the future?
CHAPTER 4
GADAMER'S RETRIEVAL OF AUTHORITY AND TRADITION
Indeed, we hear vestiges of the voice of Gadamer 
tampering with Habermas's attempt to formulate a philosophy 
of history at once ideal and material. This leads us to the 
next section of this paper in which we will further develop 
the hermeneutic approach to intersubjectivity as it is 
clarified against the Enlightenment's insistence upon
objective meaning in intersubjectivity. We will begin with
a recapitulation of Gadamer's hermeneutic project followed 
by his rebuttal of dogmatic reflection. This will tie us 
into Ricoeur's analysis of the interconnectedness of 
ideology and utopia in the cultural imagination and the 
subsequent replacement of the use of quasi-transcendental 
rules with active hope.
Habermas's theory of rational reconstruction is at odds
with Gadamer's hermeneutic assessment of reflection and 
authority in tradition. Gadamer does not square off
authority against reason, as implied by Habermas's depiction 
of tradition and authority as an unreasoned, nature-like 
process of ruthless repression. This link between authority 
and reason is essential for the understanding of Gadamer's 
description of hermeneutics as a universal experience. For
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Gadamer, all experience is an interpretation, a fusing of 
horizons of prejudice. Which means to say that we are what 
we have experienced and that is what we bring to every 
possible experience. We are thus "prejudiced" simply 
because we are beings in history where we encounter 
otherness. We are beings who have diverse experiences to be 
expressed, never fully, but proximally, hopefully, in 
language. It is the authority of our prejudices which gives 
us an orientation to the world, and a motivation for action, 
be we war veterans, lovers, mothers, senators, friends or 
mariners. We speak to the future through our traditions, 
and through the risking of these traditions in language, or 
intersubjective dialogue.
Language, then, is "the game of interpretation that we 
all are engaged in every d a y . "64 Everyone participates as 
equals. There are none that are endowed with superior 
knowledge or hold a position of objectivity separate from 
the historical process. Rather, all are playing the game of 
interpreting, of understanding, "especially when we see 
through prejudices or tear away the pretenses that hide 
reality."65 Understanding as "seeing through" something odd 
or unintelligible is understanding that "solves" a 
difficulty.
Gadamer questions Habermas: "Does this mean that we
'understand' only when we see through pretexts or unmask 
false pretentions?"66 js this the true "power" of
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reflection? To see through ideology's Oz? Gadamer claims 
that as such a power, reflection is required to "shake the 
dogmatism of life-praxis." Gadamer identifies this as a 
prejudice against authority, because "reflection is not 
always and unavoidably a step towards dissolving prior 
convictions. Authority is not always wrong."67 He accuses 
Habermas of sinking into the prejudice of the Enlightenment 
that sees making the structures of prejudice transparent as 
possibly leading to an acknowledgement of authority.
Gadamer is quick to concede the innumerable forms of 
domination stemming from the dogmatic power of authority. 
He cites examples from education, to the military and 
government to political entities and fanatics. He asserts 
that the outward appearance of obedience to authority cannot 
indicate why or even if that authority is legitimate. One 
cannot tell if "the context is true order or the veiled 
disorder that is created by the arbitrary exercise of 
power."68 For Gadamer, acceptance or acknowledgement is the 
key to relationships of authority. And further, what is the 
foundation of this acknowledgement? Granted, acceptance can 
express "a yielding of the powerless to the one holding 
power rather than true acceptance," but this is not true 
obedience, because it is not founded upon authority but 
rather on force. The rise or decline of authority in 
history shows how it is identified and fostered. "It lives 
not from dogmatic power but from dogmatic a c c e p t a n c e ."69
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Dogmatic acceptance hinges on the concession to a superior 
knowledge and insight of the authority, "and for this reason 
one believes that authority is right."70 This concession, 
this belief, is the fulcrum of acceptance or 
non-acceptance. "Authority can rule only because it is 
freely recognized and accepted. The obedience that belongs 
to true authority is neither blind nor s l a v i s h . "71 Thus, we 
can see Habermas's own appeal to authority in his 
instatement of the quasi-transcendental standards as
intersubjectively recognized rules.
A) Gadamer's Concept of Finite Effective Reflection Counter 
to the Concept of Reflection in Idealist Thought
Turning to the theme of reflection, Gadamer questions
whether reflection indeed "always dissolves substantial
relationships or is capable of taking them up into
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "72 w e have dissolution on the one hand and
preservation or acceptance on the other. This is a
counter-claim to Habermas's claim that only tradition is
fallow ground for the acceptance of authority or
prejudices. Gadamer insists that authority can only be
rooted in insight as a hermeneutical process. Tradition
alone is not a validation of something, not where validity
is demanded by reflection. Regarding validity,
"Where does reflection demand it? 
Everywhere? I would object to such an answer on 
the grounds of the finitude of human existence and 
the essential particularity of reflection. The 
real question is whether one sees the function of 
reflection as bringing something to awareness in
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order to confront what is in fact accepted with 
other possibilities-so that one can either throw 
it out or reject the other possibilities and 
accept what the tradition de facto is 
presenting-or whether bringing something to 
awareness always dissolves what one has previously 
accepted."73
The concept of reflection used by Habermas is, for 
Gadamer, "a misinterpretation of reflection."74 There is an 
inherent false objectification in this idealist conception 
of reflection. The overcoming of this objectification is 
demonstrated in Husserl's theory of intentionality— which we 
have seen focuses upon the object's many and diverse 
intentionalities for meaning— and also in Heidegger's 
concept of Being and There-being as an opening or clearing 
in Being which undermines the subject-object demarcation in 
idealism. Gadamer claims "there is most certainly an inner 
reversal of intentionality in reflection, which in no way 
raises the thing meant to a thematic object. "7(> Hence, 
there is a distinction between "effective reflection," in 
which the unfolding of language occurs, and "expressive and 
thematic reflection" which makes everything an object and 
sets up the requirements for science.
In order to break through Habermas's scientific 
requirement of truth standards for the realization of 
meaning in intersubjective dialogue, we must probe into this 
distinction in reflection made apparent by Gadamer. It is 
in Gadamer's finitude of the word that there is allowed a 
space for meaning to arise in intersubjectivity through the
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dialectic of hermeneutics without recourse to thematic 
objectification.
Recall that for Gadamer, understanding presupposes a 
deep common accord that situates persons always already in 
relation to each other in their being-in-the-world, which is 
disclosed thru language. What is brought into the open, 
into the clearing in being through language, is the being of 
the object or person that is disclosed by the w o r d . 76 The 
truth of objects is not evident in the individual word, but 
rather through speech, through the linguistic event. It is 
the linguistic event of understanding that rebuffs the 
method of idealism in which the subject tabulates the 
meaning of objects as thematic judgments.
In this view of linguistic historical understanding, 
meaning is not a reproduction of judgment. Knowledge is not 
reconstructed meaning from a previously dissolved judgment, 
in logical categories. Rather, productive historical 
understanding is involved in the process, the event of 
concept formation because it recognizes the inherent 
"imperfection of the human mind" that constitutes the 
finitude distinct from the omniscience of the d i v i n e . 77
Gadamer shows three indications of this limit and 
potential of human knowledge by characterizing the human 
word, the finite word. First, "the human word is potential 
before it is actualized."78 This depicts the process of 
thought formation where what is not yet formed is at the
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same time capable of being formed, as potential. The word 
is an expression of the object which seeks expression, and 
the word is only formed through the process of thought that 
has limit because it also has the potential for expressing 
something new, something beyond or outside of the limit of 
thought.
Second, "no human word can perfectly express our 
mind."79 This is not due to a deficiency of the word, but 
rather of the mind. The word is capable of reproducing 
"completely what the mind is thinking." The mind "never 
possesses complete self-presence," because it is continually 
thinking disparate things. As opposed to the Unity of the 
Divine Word, the human word in many words. Imperfect 
presence is the mind not knowing what it knows, because it 
is "not perfectly present to itself in what it k n o w s . " 8 0
Third, in not knowing, the human mind cannot deliver a 
complete expression of our nature and substance in 
actuality, as with the Divine. Thoughts we think as well as 
words are mere accidents. "The word of human thought is 
directed towards the object, but it cannot contain it as a 
whole within itself."81 New conceptions are then intrinsic 
to thought that cannot be fully realized in any particular 
one conception. Gadamer identifies the positive aspect of 
this negative quality as the "infinity of the mind" that 
continually surpasses itself in unprecedented mental 
processes and realizes the freedom for new conceptions.
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The orientation of thought towards the object, which is 
continually being explored and given expression of meaning 
in words, is not a reflective act. What a person says or 
thinks refers to the thing or object that he/she thinks. 
"His mind is not directed back towards his own thinking when 
he forms the word."82 The word is a product of the mind 
thinking a thought through. The word remains in the mental 
sphere, and thus gives the impression that the mind has an 
attitude towards itself and that "speaking to oneself is a 
reflexive thing.”83 Gadamer denies this latter claim and 
states that it is this structure of thought that enables it 
to "direct itself reflectively towards itself and can thus 
become an object to itself."8^ This "inwardness of the 
word" allows this false impression to describe thought as a 
movement from thinking to speaking to oneself. The
appearance is created that the formation of the word arises 
from the movement of the mind towards itself."83 But this 
is only an appearance because what is expressed is not the 
mind, but the object. The word is not an adequation of mind 
with reality, but rather a "similitudo rei," a similar 
reality, distinct from the object. The unity of the word'' 
and object is so proximal that it is here that "knowledge is 
completed."88
"The unity of the word that is revealed in the
multiplicity of words manifests something that is not 
covered by the structure of logic and brings out the
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eventual character of language: the process of concept
formation."87 Thus Gadamer discards the idealist
thematicizing approach to understanding and vouches for the 
dynamics of limit and potentiality in language. Language 
embodies the multiplicity of human words which reveal what 
is said as well as harboring as possibility that which is 
unsaid. In this finitude of word pulses an infinity of 
meaning.
The task of expressing the "similitudo rei" of the word 
is the task of metaphor in linguistic consciousness. 
Without becoming ensnared in the inductive process of 
universal subsumption of word meanings (one word meaning
corresponding to an object), metaphor is the immanent 
recognition of similarities in dissimilar objects as the 
transferral of meaning from one thing to another. As such a 
transferral, meaning hovers in the gap between objects, 
between words. This dialectic between objects is the 
dialectical expansion of horizons of meaning, or of concepts 
in the act of linguistic understanding through metaphor. 
Metaphor attempts to bridge the gap between word and object.
The difference between this active formulation of
concepts and the logical application of universal concepts 
to objects is the use of language. For the former,
productive understanding is language, a language turned 
outward in a dialectical relationship with the object. In 
the latter, understanding is reproductive meaning
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demonstrated over and over again in language. Here language 
is reduced to a grammatical instrument, a system of signs. 
Language is used to designate the meaning of objects through 
the use of terms that correspond the mind to the object. 
Here then, the "original connection between speaking and 
thinking . . . is changed into an instrumental
relationship."88 Science has succeeded in immobilizing 
language by subjugating the object to the "technical term," 
which ossifies meaning as a consistent theme, and so makes 
this "terminological use of a word an act of violence 
against language."8®
In the sense of linguistic understanding that we have 
come to know, this infers a violence against understanding. 
The correspondence theory of knowledge obliterates the 
tension that exists between word and object, limit and 
potential in effective-historical understanding. This 
tension is the font of new meaning and potential for 
understanding; it is the recognition of the human mind's 
finitude.
What is at stake here is not just a theory of language, 
but the method of science that determines objective 
knowledge in an attitude of unification, not limitation. 
Science in this regard assumes an air of omnipotence that 
runs counter to the very search for objective knowledge, 
which indicates that science is an incomplete and therefore 
limited body of knowledge. The rule of science will be
109
complete with the elimination of the question, of the 
testing of our finitude in the world.
Having language, and hence "having the world" issues 
not from the application of fixated concepts as in 
scientific-instrumental rationality, but from the writhing, 
twisting movement of the freedom of language engaging in our 
own finite existence. It is the event of tradition working 
in the present to expand the limit of one's horizon through 
the dialectic of question and possible answer.
This mode of hermeneutic neffective-reflection" which 
does not necessarily "dissolve previous convictions," brings 
something to consciousness and approximates meaning through 
metaphor. This "similarity" that recognizes the difference 
between word and object keeps open the avenue of meaning at 
limbo in the gap of possibility. Metaphor completes the gap 
by attempting to capture meaning and make it into 
objectifiable knowledge. This illusion of certain knowledge 
is the snag which allows knowledge to be unravelled and 
exposed as ideology and also revealed as utopia, as certain 
meaning coexistent with possible meaning.
B) Distortion as Necessary to Reflection and Language
The point is, however, that distortion and deception 
are inherent to language and to reflection, regardless of 
the position taken by the theorist; be they idealist, 
critical, or hermeneutic. It must be contingent and 
illusory because of the finitude of human being always in
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flux. What bridges this finitude to certainty is belief. 
Belief that there is a meaning of the word in relation to 
the object, to the other; belief that these many "certain" 
meanings can be called knowledge; belief that this knowledge 
carries a certain authority, and that this authority is 
valid, and hence acceptable and as such, an orientation to 
action in the world, specifically intersubjective activity.
For Gadamer, authority rests in the relation of finite 
human being to the Divine; for Habermas, it exists in reason 
and science as universal bodies of truth. We have seen
Habermas's retrieval of the ideals of the Enlightenment in
his theory of rational reconstruction. Within this theory 
Habermas can do three distinct but interconnected things. 
One, he can rehabilitate the rule of reason thru the 
emphasis on self-reflection while keeping reason in a 
material context by being realized in language. Two, he can 
liberate humanity from the net of the techno-scientific 
complex, and remain in keeping with the emancipatory goals 
of Marxism by relegating instrumental reason to its proper
category of knowledge constitutive interests. And three, he 
can establish claims to universal human interests and their 
corresponding ideals which become ever more apparent through 
the removal of distorting structures of symbolization, or 
authority.
The first two points were criticized through Gadamer's 
refutation of idealist reflection as objectifying and
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thematic, which close off the possibility of new meaning, 
and hence new claims to truth.
The third point will be taken up by referring to the 
work of Paul Ricoeur on ideology and utopia as necessary 
features of a living society.
CHAPTER 5
RICOEUR'S ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA
Let us examine the third point from the joint footing 
of ideology and utopia "as deviant attitudes toward social 
reality."90 This is a "criterion of non-congruence," or
disparity which assumes "that individuals as well as 
collective entities may be related to social reality not 
only in a mode of a participation without distance 
(congruence), but also in a mode of non-congruence which may 
assume various forms. This two-sided assumption is the
work of a social or cultural imagination which operates in 
either constructive or destructive tones. It is possible 
that there is a complementarity to ideology and utopia, that 
is, that the constructive side of one may enhance the 
distortive, or deconstructive side of the other, and
vice-versa. Thus, the distortions of ideology may
complement the aura of possibility in utopia, and the 
coherent, socially adhesive aspect of ideology may
complement utopia as a subversive force in society.
In order to develop the point-counterpoint of ideology 
and utopia, we shall follow Ricoeur's positing of the 
dialectic between ideology and utopia as the dynamic of the 
cultural imagination.
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A) Ideology as Conservative and Integrative
Ideology is generally understood as a pejorative 
concept, as concealment and distortion, as illustrated by 
Marx in the German Ideology.92 Ricoeur selects this
approach because it is a concept that is related to persons 
in real material conditions, and also because it is the mark 
of a new anthropology which concentrates upon reality as 
praxis, i.e., "the activity of human individuals submitted 
to circumstances which are felt as compulsory and seen as 
powers foreign to their w i l l . " 9 3  This overturns the
I
Hegelian anthropology of consciousness and the idea of 
species-being as the base of social reality.
In this respect ideology is "a sphere of
representations, ideas, conceptions" in opposition to the 
"sphere of actual p r o d u c t i o n . "94 jt is the discrepancy 
between the imaginary and the real; appearance and 
actuality. Assuredly, this demonstrates a gap between the 
"unactual representations in general (religious, political, 
juridical, ethical, aesthetical, etc.) and the actuality of 
the l i f e - p r o c e s s . "95 However, in Marxist theory, and we can 
call upon Habermas for this, this gap cripples human action 
and subjects it to a vicious circle of class conflict 
dependent upon technology for abatement.
Ricoeur quotes Marx as declaring that "each new class 
which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is 
compelled merely in order to carry through its aim, to
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represent its interests as the common interest of every 
member of society."96 Here Ricoeur identifies the relation 
of interest to its ideal expression as one not in the 
context of causation, but rather of motivation. This 
introduces legitimation as the prime concern of social 
activity. There needs to be a process of justification in 
order "to represent a particular interest as general, as the 
only rational, universally valid one."9?
But Marx's shift from Hegelian reason working in ideas 
as transformative to material interest "expressed" in ideas 
is unsatisfactory for Ricoeur on two counts. One, "it 
presupposes that the notions of rationality and universal 
validity make sense by themselves, before being captured by 
i n t e r e s t . " 9 8  And two, this "capture" claims that domination 
cannot succeed without successful arguments staged to uphold 
claims to legitimation by the ruling Class.
In order to substantiate and probe his objections to 
Marx's obscure use of interest as validation for 
legitimation, Ricoeur turns to Max Weber's work on the 
problem of domination. In reference to the political power 
upheld by the state, Weber asserts that "it is an induction 
from experience that no system of authority voluntarily 
limits itself to the appeal to material or effectual or 
ideal motives as a basis for guaranteeing its continuance. 
In addition every system attempts to establish and to 
cultivate the belief in its 'legitimacy1."99
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Now the ground has been prepared for speaking of
legitimacy in terms of human action as having motives that
are backed by an enculturated belief. "The belief in the 
existence of a legitimate order relies on this assumption. 
The problem of validity cannot be raised in other terms than 
those of the motivation of meaningful action."100
Thus we can flashback to Gadamer's claim that authority 
rests on its acceptance which is founded on belief. Now we 
see that the contingency of finite being and meaning in
hermeneutic understanding, to which belief is integral,
takes on a certain form in the organized functioning of the 
social realm. Recall that with Habermas this form was 
identified by the quasi-transcendental rules of the ideal 
speech situation. But historical hermeneutical
understanding rejects such exclusion of other possible forms 
of life by dogmatic authority. Thus there needs to be a 
mode of social theory compatible with the dynamics of a 
hermeneutics of ontology. Ricoeur provides such a mode in 
the polemic of ideology and utopia which serves to register 
the meaningful content of the beliefs which orient 
intersubjective activity.
For Ricoeur, there is a breach between a claim to 
legitimacy and a belief in legitimacy, or "the claim raised 
by authority and a belief conceded by individuals."101 This 
is the field for the cultivation of beliefs referred to by 
Weber. This gap, or rather, authority’s "unavoidable excess
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of claim over against belief," is filled by ideology. 
Because ideology is intended to reinforce belief so that it 
alleviates the demand for legitimacy, this "credibility gap" 
is the well of distortion and deviation between claim and 
belief. The process which for Marx gives "ideas the form of 
universality, and presenting them as the only rational, 
universally valid ones," gains coherence for Ricoeur as the 
distortion that is required by the claim of authority to 
legitimacy to fill the credibility gap.
Keep in mind that we are working in a realm not of 
determinate causality as in class conflict and the 
inevitable fall of capitalism. We are working in a realm of 
action determined by a rationally motivated individual in 
history. As equal partners in social activity, the meaning 
of any one person's beliefs is as valid as any other's. 
Each has equal authority in their prejudices. It is when it 
comes to having a shared belief that there become 
discrepancies in meaning and authority simply because of the 
discrepancies in individual experiences, and hence 
prejudices. In order to accept one belief instead of 
another, and so share a belief (for the shared beliefs of a 
society insure the stability and cohesion of institutions 
which provide for social needs), the authority of this 
shared belief must be validated in its now unequal status as 
a social belief rising out of intersubjective activity. 
This takes us right back to Gadamer's concept of play. It
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is in the play of intersubjective dialogue that we allow a 
meaning, a belief, to "make a claim over one."
Because being is not a static process, but a continual 
becoming, any claim of meaning is vulnerable to change in 
the freedom of individuals' activity. But the organism of 
society is such that it demands a continuity in the form of 
institutions. Thus, the claim of meaning that was once free 
and equal becomes instituted in society as authority amidst 
equal partners. The continuity of this authority depends 
upon its acceptance by society. Now we can discern a change 
in character of meaning that makes a claim, or authority, 
and meaning still operating as possibility. The first is
static in its position of continuity in institutions, and 
the second is dynamic as potential meaning for being that is 
a becoming.
Meaning that makes a claim needs reinforcement to 
maintain itself as a shared meaning amongst contending
individual meanings. It is always subject to the violence 
of the historical process of change. Thus authority has a 
demand for legitimacy and the concession of individuals who 
share a belief in the meaning of this authority that has 
claimed them, claimed them through their own rational
intersubjective activity. This is where ideology steps in
to fill the "credibility gap" of the excess of the claim 
over against the belief. Ideology functions as a distorting 
steroid which sustains authority through history.
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Ricoeur layers the concept of ideology working from a 
symbolic base. Beneath the level of distortion we discover 
systems of legitimation that meet the claim to legitimacy 
demanded by a system of authority (filling the credibility 
gap between belief and authority). And beneath this level 
we find yet another system of symbolization which 
constitutes action itself. This torte of ideology is a 
means to pattern, integrate, and consolidate an order of 
action. It provides stability in society, whether a ruling 
class, system of authority or stable community. Ideology is 
the cohesion for human order that is susceptible to 
splintering by the forces of nature or history, or internal 
or external disruptions. "All the pathology of ideology 
proceeds from this 'conservative' role of ideology."102
B) Utopia as Otherness and Possibility
The lurking possibility of disruption to a given order 
is an alternative order to this given order. This is the 
function of utopia, to present the voice of subversion to 
ideology. "The utopian mode is to the existence of society 
what invention is to scientific knowledge."103 It excels in 
imagination. Utopia is the language of "another" - another 
society, another reality, another world. Inventive
imagination shuns integrative functions for a world of 
"otherness." This "search for 'otherness' has no thematic 
unity, but instead implies the most diverse and opposed 
claims. Another family, another sexuality, may mean
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monasticism or sexual community. Another way of consuming 
may mean asceticism or sumptuous consumption."104
Ricoeur uses the same method of explicating utopia as 
he did with ideology by regressing to the idea of utopia as 
"nowhere." Coined by Thomas More as a literary term for a 
place with no place, utopia has retained its meaning as a 
ghost place in the imagination. This holds a significant
function for society. As an open possibility, utopia 
provides a porthole for looking in on our reality. Through 
the glass of utopia, we are separated from our accustomed 
ways of living, and they are not so familiar anymore, for
nothing is taken for granted, bepause now there is this
possibility beyond actuality, "a field for alternative ways 
of living."105 utopia is the contestation of what is. It 
counters the integrative function of ideology as utopia 
itself appears as social subversion.
Utopia interrogates given systems of authority. 
Ideology reinforces authority by providing legitimation 
structures for it. This credibility gap is pried open by 
utopias that indicate "alternative ways of using power,
whether in family, political, economic or religious life; in 
that they call established systems of power into
question."106
This apparent opposition between the stabilizing role 
of ideology and the subversive power of utopia can be seen
as corresponding pathologies in the legitimation or
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contestation of a system of power. The positive aspects of 
both can be seen as ideology as conservation and utopia as a 
schema of perfection.
This latter view of utopia may appear as eccentric or 
erratic, as a decentering device. But "what decenters 
ourselves is also what brings us back to ourselves." Such 
is the paradox of utopian imagination. "On the one hand 
there is no movement towards full humanity which does not go 
beyond the given; on the other hand, elsewhere leads back to 
here and now."107
C) The Dynamic Dialectic of Ideology and Utopia as 
Distortion
But the "interplay of ideology and utopia" cannot 
function without each other. The need for ideology to 
mediate social ties, to reinforce belief; identifies "a gap, 
a distance and consequently something potentially 
eccentric," a potential utopia. This interplay is a process 
of dynamic imagination, not a state of being. This dynamic 
necessitates the distortions and pathologies of ideology and 
utopia. This creative dynamic of the imagination can only 
be ascertained through a relation to the figures of false 
consciousness; ideology and utopia. "It is as though we 
have to call upon the 'healthy1 function of ideology to cure 
the madness of utopia and as though the critique of 
ideologies can only be carried out by a conscience capable 
of regarding itself from the point of view of 'nowhere.1"108
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We have taken a route through Ricoeur for a view of 
hermeneutics at work in history through ideology and 
utopia. We have countered the last point of Habermas's 
objection of hermeneutics, i.e., its failure to remove or 
critique distorting structures of symbolization, or 
tradition and authority which would secure the values of 
human freedom and autonomy.
Ricoeur, through the hermeneutic method retains, 
through ideology, the structures of symbolization that 
orient action in the world while providing a critical view 
of these structures of authority through utopia. The social 
participant remains historical without recourse to 
quasi-transcendentals which secure meaning and limit the 
imagination. There is no getting rid of distortion, because 
distortion is necessary for the cohesion as well as 
transformation of society. This dialectic is active and its 
reconciliation temporary and utopian, yearning for an 
"otherness" and a coming back to being in the present, to 
which we might apply this "otherness" from our imagination. 
Thus, the goals of the ideal speech situation, of reaching 
autonomy and responsibility, as well as the boundaries 
themselves (truth, truthfulness, rightness and
comprehensibility) need to be viewed as one possibility of 
utopia. This is one possibility to be worked out in the 
larger sphere of the hermeneutics of being.
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This is not to trivialize the Habermasian project, for 
its intentions and implications speak to the heart of a 
concern for humanity in an age of diminishing potency of 
individual action in mass society.
However, the implications of a hermeneutic of being, or 
ontology, are not significant only for the "foundations of 
knowledge," but also as a shift away from the arrogance of 
the Enlightenment with which human beings have perceived 
their environment and themselves. My emphasis upon belief 
in regard to Gadamer's finitude of the word, and its 
telltale wag in Ricoeur's essay on the cultural imagination 
is a counter to the idealist certainty of reasoned 
knowledge, and Habermas's ideal speech situation. The 
debate may be visibly one concerning the significance of 
authority in tradition, but moreso it is one concerning 
authority in being, or the finitude of humans in relation to 
a larger totality.
Habermas imbibes in a tradition of perhaps not an ideal 
intersubjectivity, but an intersubjectivity that can claim 
its future from its position of superior critical knowledge, 
or dogmatism. Habermas does not give his theory over to the 
play, the risk, the tension of a sphere of possible 
meaning. If he did, he would risk losing his position of 
authority to other historical possibilities.
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D) Hope as a Replacement for Rational Reconstruction
The hermeneutic game is one of a decentered subject,
thrown into a plethora of "otherness," not just utopian, but 
the otherness of a text, a person, a beetle or a beach. But 
freedom is freedom in a context, active in the world. This 
freedom is garnered by both hope and belief; situated in the 
dialectic of decentered subjectivity. This is the milieu of 
the "category of hope, the category of contradiction," where 
reconciliation is looked for in spite of contingency.109 
There is a demand for meaning that Can be tested in the gap 
between what is and would be possible.
Bringing hope into play, so to speak, places freedom in
a different perspective than that offered by Habermas. 
Freedom for Habermas is attained through cognitive 
reasoning, the emancipatory interest in self-reflection that 
is realized in language. "Reason is the will to reason." 
For Ricoeur, freedom shows itself in a doing, not a 
knowing. Freedom can only be constituted in the acts of 
freedom. It involves the originary action of belief. "I 
must believe that I am free. I can only begin from the 
belief that I can (one must believe that it can be). I am 
what I can do and can do what I a m . " H O  As act, freedom 
attests to works, and in society, these works take the form 
of institutions. Thus ideology and utopia are at the core 
of the very constitution of social reality for they provide 
the possibility for systems of symbolization to create a
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social reality as institutional and hence as a realization 
of human freedom.
It is in the dialectic of contradiction between what is 
and possibility, which we saw in metaphor, intersubjective
dialogue, and the interplay of ideology and utopia, that
hope is realized. The "in spite of" contingency or
distortion is an active hope that works out possibilities 
from the imagination, not a set of ideals, i.e., proscribed 
systems of values and meaning. Hope is taken up with 
diversity and activity. This is not intersubjectivity with 
a semi-idealist pilot hovering on the edge of history. This 
is an intersubjectivity grappling with finitude, continually 
testing prejudices and possibilities through experience. 
Hope becomes a substitute for rational reconstruction in 
that it recognizes distortion as part of the human condition 
and a plurality of meaning in spite of it.
Hope finds its counter in dejection, that state of 
being where one expects nothing from himself, others, or 
life. It dissolves the relationships with the world into an 
immobilization of life that has no resemblance to fear. 
Gabriel Marcel contrasts this immobility with the inner 
activity of hope as prophetic.
Marcel begins expounding on courageous hope by 
characterizing courage as facing something. In this 
instance, courage is a matter of denial, or treating 
something as nonexistent and of no value. "The soldier who
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defies death behaves as though death were of no 
account."HI Marcel is careful to note that courage does 
not mean deluding oneself regarding the given situation. On 
the contrary, courage is at its peak when the situation is 
most clearly appreciated. The denial is not only on value, 
but on existence as well. "The opposition between existence 
and value cannot be regarded as absolute. Fundamentally it 
is precisely this opposition which hope transcends, in a 
sense, it denies."112 The person who hopes for a world of 
justice is not stating a preference for a just world over an 
unjust world. Rather, he/she "proclaims that this world 
shall come into existence; in this lies the prophetic nature 
of hope . . . the being who hopes is putting forth a sort of 
interior activity."113 But hope is not just for one's own 
self, but finds its generative power in spreading it to 
others. Marcel offers the expansive character of hope as 
intersubjectivity.
In a conversation with Paul Ricoeur, Marcel engages in 
a discussion of the topic of intersubjectivity. 
"Intersubjectivity is openness to the other, an openness 
which is perpetually threatened because at every moment the 
self may close itself again and become a prisoner of itself, 
no longer considering the other except in relation to 
itself. But the possibility of opening to others, that is, 
through charity (is where) experience undergoes a certain 
transformation in that it takes on the value of a test."H4
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To which Ricoeur replies that Marcel's work on mystery is 
not a Platonic escape to an "elsewhere," but rather a 
meditation on the concrete. "It is the act of recognizing 
others which ceaselessly leads us to experience and makes 
experience a test." • In agreeing, Marcel answers that, "For 
me what is essential for man is to recognize but also to 
admit his faults, to recognize his errors," And Ricoeur, 
"It is to this act of recognition that we must look for the 
true sense of hope," And later, Ricoeur, "We have come to 
see that hope and journeying are not two different things, 
but that hope is what makes the passage something more than 
just simple wandering; your expression 'being is being 
underway.' That's hope . . . the unity of your concrete
philosophy is the conjunction of two ideas, the labyrinth of 
existence and the rays of hope that cross it; your 'I hope 
in you for us.' Hope is always coming back, but beneath our 
experience and not above it, if I may put it that way."
The prophetic nature of hope speaks the language of 
denial of that which is, and casts the expansive, 
intersubjective nature of hope into the tension, the enigma 
of being. Could it not be said that the intending will of 
the subject participating in the event of being is the will 
of hope? This hope is at once violent and affirmative, and 
also beyond; transformative becoming, being underway. It 
denies what is and yet recognizes what was and the potential 
for experience in a larger totality of being, of meaning.
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We have traversed a vast vista of thought concerning 
intersubjectivity. We have maneuvered our way from Husserl 
to hope. We have persevered through a transcendental 
legitimation for intersubjective meaning and have been 
subjected to the historical tension of intersubjectivity in 
Heidegger and Gadamer. We have seen the necessity for a 
critical element to question authority intersubjectively in 
Habermas, and have allowed for this in the active hope of 
the decentered subject in Ricoeur.
There are essentially two modes of intersubjectivity 
running through this paper. On the one hand, there is the 
idealist concern with a presuppositionless foundation for 
objectively shared knowledge and meaning. This focuses on 
the primacy of truth and reason for determining guides to 
action in the world. On the other hand, there is the 
historical-hermeneutic concern with the essential 
relatedness of human being with a world that is a myriad of 
contingency, tension and distortion. It relies upon the 
possibilizing imagination and belief to orient action thru a 
linguistic understanding of being as being underway. The 
first mode appropriates the values of the Enlightenment, of 
the subject over and against the world, with reason 
vicariously assuming the power of the unity of the 
infinite. The second mode holds no pretense of its limits, 
and takes the responsibility of its finitude in an openness
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to the other and the promise of being while recognizing 
human fallibility and the origin of meaning in the dialogue 
of the vocal and the voiceless.
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